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Act CCVIII of 2011 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, defines the primary objective of Hungary’s central bank as the achievement 
and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function more effectively, contributes to better 
economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and employment.
In the inflation targeting system, since August 2005 the Bank has sought to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation 
rate near the 3 per cent medium-term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank, performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order 
to establish the monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of 
careful consideration of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the 
inflation outlook, money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance transparency, the 
Bank publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report presents the 
inflation forecasts prepared by the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis Departments, as well 
as the macroeconomic developments underlying these forecasts. The Report is published quarterly. The forecasts of the 
Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis Departments are based on assumption of endogenous 
monetary policy. In respect of economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous 
issues of the Report are applied.
 
 
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial 
Analysis Departments and Financial Stability Departments. From chapters 1 to 4 and 6 were prepared under the general 
direction of Ágnes Csermely, Director while chapter 5 was directed by Áron Gereben, Director. The project was managed 
by Barnabás Virág, Senior Economist of Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis. The Report was approved for publication 
by Ferenc Karvalits, Deputy Governor.
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Summary
According to the March forecast, the gradual adjustment of economic agents’ 
balance sheets will continue in both Hungary and Europe, leading to modest 
growth over the forecast horizon. In response to cost shocks and tax 
measures, inflation is expected to be significantly higher than the inflation 
target in 2012. however, in 2013, as the impact from indirect tax increases 
and cost shocks wear off, weak domestic demand may become the dominant 
factor in developments in the price index and inflation may quickly decrease. 
Stable financial markets and a stable financial intermediary system are 
indispensable for the economy to embark on to a path of permanent growth. 
The base rate consistent with the baseline scenario will stay at the current 
level during the next quarters. Over the second half of the forecast horizon 
the base rate may decrease gradually if developments in inflation are in line 
with the forecast and there is a lasting improvement in the risk perception 
of hungary. to meet the budget deficit targets for 2012 and 2013 further 
government measures are expected. These haven’t been announced yet in 
detail, so these are not incorporated in the baseline scenario of the report. 
Government measures aiming to meet budget deficit targets may significantly 
alter developments in inflation and growth.
in the final quarter of 2011 economic growth was more dynamic than 
expected, mainly due to temporary factors. Growth in the agricultural sector 
remained robust in the final quarter as well, and state infrastructure projects 
supported the construction industry and investments at the end of the year.
Growth continues to be characterised by two main trends. On the one hand, 
the contribution of exports to growth remains significant, while on the other 
hand, domestic demand is still subdued. Although economic activity in 
hungary’s main export partners slowed after 2011 Q1, export sales continued 
to rise dynamically. Export sales were probably boosted by the performance 
of the German manufacturing sector and the depreciating exchange rate. 
Nevertheless, European economic output may contract over the short term, 
and only a slow recovery is likely afterwards. The outlook for moderate 
growth can be ascribed to tighter fiscal policies in most European countries 
and the fact that the European banking system will have to make considerable 
adjustments, despite the supporting measures. As a result, its contribution 
to growth will be limited. In line with the growth prospects in Europe, 
external demand is likely to recover slowly in the years to come.
Weak domestic demand continues to hamper domestic growth. Uncertainties 
surrounding growth, decreasing income of households and continuously tight 
credit conditions are all factors working against a pick-up in household 
consumption. These effects can only be partly offset by the new fixed 
exchange rate programme, which decreases the amount and the volatility of 
households’ repayment obligations. Investment activity remains very sluggish. 
the baseline scenario of the report  
in March forecasts declining inflation 
over the medium term and modest 
growth 
the pick-up in economic activity at 
the end of 2011 was mainly due to 
temporary factors
Slower economic activity in europe 
may translate into slow growth of 
exports over the forecast horizon 
Domestic demand remains subdued 
over the forecast horizon
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With the exception of a few export companies implementing large-scale 
investments in manufacturing, most corporations have postponed investments, 
given the uncertain economic outlook and tight lending conditions. Protracted 
balance sheet adjustments in the private sector and fiscal adjustments point 
to subdued domestic demand over the entire forecast horizon. 
The banking system has supported economic recovery only to a limited 
extent recently. A pick-up in lending is hindered by poor credit demand and 
consistently strong constraints on the supply side. The financing-related 
problems facing the European banking system make access to funds difficult 
and expensive for domestic banks, which, in turn, curbs a recovery in 
consumption and investments. Foreign parent banks have withdrawn funds 
from their Hungarian subsidiaries over the past period. Underlying reasons 
for this were fewer lending opportunities and the deteriorating profitability 
of the domestic banking system, along with the mounting problems of the 
European banking system and the balance sheet adjustments it had to make. 
The domestic banking system’s lending activity continued to decline in the 
corporate sector. Non-price conditions remain tight, with the banking sector 
focusing mainly on corporate clients with a good credit standing. In response 
to the early final repayment scheme, there was a pick-up in lending in the 
household segment, but consistent with a subdued real estate market, 
lending may slow down in the short term.
We assume that both the corporate and the retail loan portfolios will shrink 
further in the years to come. Tight credit conditions, supply constraints and 
the banking system’s reluctance to lend may hinder recovery in lending for a 
prolonged period, in addition to weak credit demand. To counterbalance 
these unfavourable developments, the central bank introduced several 
measures to provide liquidity to the banking sector, but these measures can 
only soften the negative impact of the uncertainty related to the availability 
of foreign funds on lending activity.
the above factors suggest that GDp growth will be close to stagnation in 2012 
and the growth rate is expected to remain modest in 2013 as well. the 
potential rate of economic growth will lag behind its pre-crisis rate in the 
coming years, but due to subdued growth output will only slowly approach 
its potential, and thus the output gap will remain negative over the entire 
forecast horizon.
 In keeping with the outlook for weak growth, the labour market is likely to 
remain consistently slack. In response to the government measures adopted 
earlier, labour market activity may continue to recover in 2011. however, in 
parallel with the renewed deterioration in the growth outlook, corporations 
will continue to make extremely cautious decisions on employment. Labour 
demand in the private sector will not increase significantly, and only job 
programmes subsidised by the government are expected to provide additional 
demand for labour.
The slack labour market environment curbs nominal wage growth. 
Administrative measures introduced early this year may accelerate wage 
dynamics temporarily, but wage growth is anticipated to slow down again in 
2013.
tight lending conditions, further 
balance sheet adjustment in the 
banking sector and contracting retail 
and corporate loan portfolios are 
expected 
GDp growth will be close to stagnation 
in 2012 and the growth rate is 
expected to remain modest in 2013
the labour market is expected to 
remain consistently slack, and − 
discounting the temporary impact of 
the minimum wage increase − wage 
dynamics will remain sluggish
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SUMMARY
Despite weak domestic demand and the slack labour market environment, 
inflation rose significantly in early 2012. the rise in inflation was mainly 
attributable to the government’s indirect tax increases, but the marked 
depreciation of the exchange rate in 2011 h2 and persistently high commodity 
prices also had an impact on more and more components of the consumer 
basket. The magnitude and the pass-through of the shocks were somewhat 
larger than previously expected, pointing to slightly higher inflation than 
anticipated earlier.
in our baseline scenario, inflation is well above the inflation target in 2012. 
however, in 2013, with the waning impact of indirect tax increases and cost 
shocks, weak domestic demand may become the dominant factor in the 
development in inflation and the price index may decrease quickly. Keeping 
the base rate at its current level will also support lower inflation. Our 
projection is that inflation will reach the 3 percent inflation target in 2013 
H1.
Developments in the money and capital markets may continue to influence 
the economic outlook to a large extent. The pronounced volatility on the 
money and capital markets in the past quarter was driven by global 
developments and changing market expectations related to the starting date 
and the outcome of the talks with the European Commission and the IMF. 
After a rise in the risk premium early this year, the government reiterated its 
commitment to starting the talks, helping to put the financial markets at 
ease. Thanks to the European Central Bank’s liquidity providing measures, 
the financial markets of the euro area returned to normal, which also helped 
to reduce domestic premiums. Nevertheless, the risk premium of the 
domestic money and capital market instruments is still high.
Our projection is that the historically high risk premiums will remain over the 
short term, followed by a gradual decline. The gradual decline in risk 
premium may be supported by the agreement to be concluded with the 
European Commission and the IMF, along with further improvement in the 
European financial market environment and increasing global risk appetite.
Fiscal measures, primarily the reduction in income taxes, resulted in 
significant easing in 2011. however, in order for fiscal deficit targets to be 
met, sizeable fiscal adjustments curbing demand are likely to occur in 2012. 
Based on the budget bill and the announced fiscal measures we anticipate a 
fiscal adjustment of around 3 percentage points in 2012. Judging from the 
measures so far announced, no further fiscal tightening is anticipated in 
2013.
With economic actors’ balance sheet adjustments, the net lending position 
of the economy may remain significantly positive over the forecast horizon. 
The projected decline in the general government’s net borrowing improves 
lending position in 2012. although household savings may decline gradually in 
the years to come, they may remain high over the entire forecast horizon. 
The net lending position may be permanently strengthened by increased 
exports due to recent automobile industry investments, the anticipated pick-
up in external economic activity from end-2012 and increasing use of eu 
transfers.
Inflation will remain high this year 
due to government measures and cost 
shocks, but the impact of the weak 
demand environment will become 
dominant by 2013, as a result of which 
the inflation target can be met in 
2013 H1
the risk premium of domestic money 
and capital market instruments is still 
high
In 2011 the central budget stimulated 
aggregate demand significantly, 
however, we anticipate a contraction 
of around 3 percent of GDp, of 
aggregate demand in the next two 
years 
In response to fiscal adjustments and 
increasing export, the net lending 
position of the economy may remain 
significantly positive
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the baseline scenario of the 
forecast. In the Monetary Council’s view, the most important risk is related 
to the developments in the risk perception of Hungarian assets. In contrast 
to what is assumed in the baseline scenario, the Monetary Council also 
believes that there is a significant risk that oil prices will remain high over 
the forecast horizon.
In our baseline forecast, risk premiums will stay at their current levels over 
the short run, and then gradually decline. Risk perception may improve more 
quickly if an agreement between the government, the European Commission 
and the IMF is reached soon and the risks related to the financing of the 
general government diminish. The risk perception of the domestic financial 
market instruments may also improve if the European financial market 
environment improves further and global risk appetite increases. Improved 
risk perception boosts economic growth and, through a stronger exchange 
rate, mitigates inflation. A rapid reduction in the sovereign risk premium may 
already allow a gradual easing of the base rate to begin in 2012.
Given the highly volatile money and capital markets, it cannot be ruled out 
that risk premiums will remain at their current high level. This would 
translate into lower growth, a weaker exchange rate and a less favourable 
outlook for inflation. Increasing inflation triggered by a weaker forint and 
higher risk premium necessitates maintaining the base rate at its current 
level.
Our baseline forecast assumes that oil prices will decline gradually over the 
forecast horizon, in line with futures prices. If geopolitical risks materialise, 
that may lead to a long-term contraction in oil supply and a perpetuation of 
the current high prices. Consistently high oil prices deteriorate the inflation 
outlook. In order to offset this, the current base rate may remain unchanged 
until the end of the forecast horizon.
uncertainties surrounding economic 
outlook are mainly related to 
Hungary’s risk perception and 
developments in commodity prices
rapid improvement in risk perception 
may justify lower base rates
Consistently high oil prices also 
warrant maintaining the current base 
rate
If risk premiums remain at their 
current high levels over the longer 
term, the base rate may not be 
decreased even in the second half of 
the forecast horizon
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SUMMARY
fanchart of the inflation forecast
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Summary table of baseline scenario
(our forecast were based on endogenous monetary policy)
2011 2012 2013
fact projection
Inlation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.7 5.3 2.9
Core inflation without indirect tax effects 2.5 3.0 2.7
Consumer price index 3.9 5.6 3.0
economic growth
External demand (GDP based)2 2.8 0.9 1.8
Household consumption expenditure 0.0 −0.9 0.2
Gross fixed capital formation −5.4 −1.4 1.8
Domestic absorption −0.5 −1.5 0.3
Export 8.4 5.8 8.7
Import 6.3 4.6 8.2
GDP* 1.7 0.1 1.5
external balance
Current account balance 1.6 3.1 3.7
External financing capacity 3.6 5.7 7.0
Government balance3
ESA balance 4.2 −4.0 (−3.1) −4.3 (−3.4)
labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 5.0 3.1 3.1
Whole-economy employment5 0.8 1.8 0.7
Private sector gross average earnings6 5.3 6.5 4.1
Private sector employment5 1.4 −0.1 0.5
Unit labour costs in the private sector5, 7 5.0 3.8 3.5
Household real income8 1.6 −2.2 −0.1
1 From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB.
2 In line with the changes in Hungarian export structure by destination countries we revised the weights in our external demand indicator. 
3 As a percentage of GDP. Data in parenthesis include cancellation of free central reserves.
4 Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
5 According to the CSO LFS data.
6 According to the original CSO data for full-time employees.
7 Private sector unit labour costs calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
8 MNB estimate. In our current forecast we have corrected the data of household income with the effect of changes in net equity because of payments 
into mandatory private pension funds.
* Data adjusted by working day effect.
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1  Inflation and real economy outlook
The Hungarian economy is likely to stagnate this year, with growth expected to resume in 2013. The level of output will 
remain below its potential over the entire forecast horizon. Due to the indirect tax increases and the weak exchange rate, 
the consumer price index will remain above the inflation target in 2012. Underlying inflation is likely to increase as a 
consequence of rising costs. As the effects of indirect tax increases, weak exchange rate and cost shocks wane, the 
disinflationary impact of the subdued domestic demand is likely to be the key determinant of consumer prices and the 
inflation target can be achieved in the first half of 2013. Path of the base rate consistent with the baseline scenario is flat 
during the next quarters. Over the second half of the forecast horizon it may decrease gradually if developments in 
inflation are in line with the forecast and there is a lasting improvement in the risk premium. 
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Despite an environment of permanently subdued demand, 
the short-term outlook for inflation has deteriorated 
compared to the forecast in December. This higher inflation 
is attributable to several separate impacts. Despite weak 
demand, the impact of the indirect tax increases passed 
through into prices more markedly than expected. Oil 
prices are high despite the deteriorating outlook for the 
global economy. The rising costs gradually feed through to 
consumer prices despite weak demand as corporations with 
deteriorating profit outlook pass on their costs to consumers. 
Therefore underlying price developments will accelerate in 
the first half of this year. Higher commodity prices will only 
gradually be reflected in consumer prices, which will boost 
underlying inflation in 2012 h1. after temporarily 
accelerating, tax-adjusted core inflation will remain around 
2.7 per cent in the second half of the forecast horizon.
In response to dwindling global economic activity and 
government measures curbing demand, the output gap may 
start to widen again this year. from 2013 it then narrows 
gradually but remains negative over the entire forecast 
horizon. As a result, with the inflationary impact of the 
indirect tax increases and cost shocks wearing off, the 
disinflationary effect of the permanently weak domestic 
demand may play a key role in developments of the 
consumer price index. The inflation target can be met in 
2013 h1 (chart 1-1).
The projected labour market trends suggest continued low 
inflationary pressure in the years to come. Due to the poor 
growth outlook, we expect labour market conditions to 
remain slack. The bulk of the rise in corporate wage costs 
from the increase in the minimum wage will be offset by 
state compensation; therefore, this measure is unlikely to 
lead to any considerable inflationary impact over the short 
term. However, as the amount of wage compensation will 
start to decrease from 2013, the effect of the rise in the 
1.1  Inflation forecast
Over our forecast horizon, inflation is shaped by the government’s indirect tax measures, global market developments, 
rising commodity prices caused by the weak forint, and consistently low demand. Due to indirect tax increases, in force 
from early 2012, repeated rises in the global market price of oil and a EUR/HUF exchange rate weaker than the 2011 
average, inflation may exceed 5 per cent in 2012. Underlying inflation is likely to increase due to rising costs. In an 
environment of persistently subdued demand, as the direct inflationary impacts of the tax measures and cost shocks are 
wearing off, inflation may start falling and reach the target in the first half of 2013. 
Chart 1-1
Baseline scenario and fan chart of the inflation forecast
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Chart 1-2
Changes in our oil price assumptions
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INFLATION AND REAL ECONOMY OUTLOOK
minimum wage is likely to be reflected in inflation. 
Nevertheless, given that demand is expected to remain 
subdued, this impact may also be moderate (Chart 1-3).
Apart from changes in the indirect taxes, the following 
developments are likely to characterise the prices of the 
most important items in the consumer basket (Chart 1-4). 
Inflation in tradables was higher early this year, due to the 
depreciation of the forint exchange rate, the new data may 
reflect stronger pass-through. As the cost shocks wear off 
the price index of tradables may decrease considerably due 
to weak demand. As regards market services, after a sharp 
rise early this year, we expect restrained inflation in 
accordance with the slack demand. Over the medium term 
inflation in this group could be in the range of 2-3 per cent 
in line with the inflation target. The sharp rise in the price 
of processed food early this year was due to higher producer 
prices and the rising oil prices. High prices in Europe and a 
weaker forint may sustain a high inflation dynamics until 
mid-2012. this year’s harvest may support a slowdown in 
inflation.
The price of alcoholic beverages and tobacco is markedly 
influenced by excise tax increases, which may pass through 
entirely into consumer prices. 
In respect of items outside core inflation, the prices of 
unprocessed food are likely to be influenced by changes in 
the global prices of raw materials. After a significant 
decrease in 2011 h2, unprocessed food prices may increase 
moderately over the short term. After that, the trend-like 
increase observed in the price index of this group over the 
past decade is likely to continue. Fuel prices are expected 
to move in conjunction with oil prices calculated in HUF. 
Despite weak global economic activity oil prices are 
consistently high, presumably due to geopolitical reasons. 
However, futures prices suggest a decrease in prices. 
Therefore, we anticipate declining fuel prices in line with 
our assumption based on futures prices and expected 
monetary policy (Table 1-1).
Chart 1-3
our forecast for the consumer price index
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Chart 1-4
our forecast for core inflation and items outside core 
inflation 
(2008−2014 Q1) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Per centPer cent
Core inflation
Non-core inflation
table 1-1
Details of our inflation forecast
2011 2012 2013
Core inflation 2.7 5.3 2.9
non-core inflation
Unprocessed food 4.3 3.7 4.0
Gasoline and market energy 13.8 11.3 −0.4
Regulated prices 4.0 4.5 4.6
Total 6.4 6.1 3.1
Consumer price index 3.9 5.6 3.0
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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As regards regulated prices, in line with the government’s 
intention, we expect moderate, lower-than-inflation 
changes in prices in 2012. high oil prices and a consistently 
weak USD/HUF exchange rate add to the costs of service 
providers, which may result in a gradual pass-through of 
costs in early 2013.
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Our forecast for the real economy points to a significant 
slowdown in economic growth. In part, the better-than-
expected growth data in 2011 Q4is attributable, to an 
outstanding performance, of the agricultural and the 
construction sectors (relative to the preceding year), with 
infrastructural investments by the state also contributing to 
the excellent performance of the latter. With these one-off 
impacts wearing off, growth is expected to slow, and this is 
corroborated by short-term indicators. Economic growth is 
expected to reach 0.1 per cent this year, and 1.5 per cent 
next year (Chart 1-5). In keeping with the slowdown in 
Hungary’s export markets, export dynamics may also 
weaken; but exports still remain the main driver of 
economic growth. The modest growth this year is 
attributable to lower consumption and investment. At the 
same time we expect higher consumption and investment 
next year. The output gap may widen further during the 
first half of the forecast horizon. from 2013 it narrows 
gradually but remains negative over the entire forecast 
horizon. 
Similar to the forecast in December, we still find outlook for 
global growth rather poor. The anticipated balance sheet 
adjustments in the European banking system and the 
protracted debt problems in the euro-area periphery point 
to a less benign external environment. Although the ECB 
measures eased the financing difficulties of the banking 
system, they only prevented the occurrence of an 
unfavourable risk scenario. In order to tackle the debt 
problems in the euro area, tight fiscal rules were adopted. 
In order for the new regulations to be complied with, 
austerity measures may have to be adopted, which will in 
turn slow economic growth in the euro area. A slowdown in 
the economies of Hungary’s foreign trade partners will 
restrain export dynamics over the forecast horizon. 
1.2  our forecast for the real economy
Our forecast for the real economy points to a slowdown in economic growth. The slowdown in global growth, problems 
facing the European banking system and the expected fiscal measures in the euro area suggest an unfavourable external 
environment in Hungary’s export markets, which may, in turn, curb the export dynamics. This may be offset in part by 
major investments in the manufacturing industry. Tight credit conditions and the uncertain outlook for growth may lead 
to subdued investment activity. Households’ deteriorating income position will entail a decline in consumption. Government 
measures aimed to ensure that deficit targets are met will directly curtail domestic demand in the short run. The output 
gap may widen further in the first half of the forecast horizon and from 2013 it narrows gradually, but remains negative 
over the entire forecast horizon.
Chart 1-5
fan chart of our GDp forecast 
(on the basis of seasonally adjusted, balanced data)
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Chart 1-6
Changes in GDp growth
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Nevertheless, we expect Hungary’s export markets and 
hence the export dynamics to pick up from mid-2012. a 
weak HUF exchange rate and the gradual start of the 
operation of the large-scale investment projects in the 
automobile industry may support a rise in Hungary’s share 
of the export markets (Chart 1-7).
Households’ income position will deteriorate over the first 
half of the forecast horizon due to accelerating inflation, 
consistently sluggish economic activity and government 
measures aimed at meeting the fiscal deficit targets. 
Concurrently, household consumption is expected to decline 
this year. moderate growth is only expected in 2013. even 
though the increase in the minimum wage and wage 
compensation may help keep net nominal wages steady for 
those in lower income brackets, higher-than-expected 
inflation will erode the purchasing power of their income. 
Government measures aiming at increasing labour market 
activity and hence boosting potential growth, reduce direct 
budgetary transfers to households. The early final 
repayments of FX loans improved the wealth of the 
households that participated in the scheme; but its 
beneficial impact is likely to take longer to exert itself on 
consumption. In the short run, consumption-savings 
decisions are likely to be strongly influenced by precautionary 
motives and therefore the savings rate may remain above 
the pre-crisis level. Under the agreement with the Hungarian 
Banking Association, the fixed exchange rate programme 
has been adopted to alleviate the burden of high FX 
instalments of households. We expect a high participation 
rate in this scheme, which may lead to a pick up in 
consumption especially in the case of low-income households 
with liquidity constraints (Chart 1-8).
We continue to assume a subdued investment dynamics 
over our forecast horizon. Fiscal discipline may decrease 
the government’s own investments. New investments may 
only be implemented mostly from EU funds. Private sector 
investment is likely to fall this year as well. Expectations for 
a pick up in economic activity have been deteriorating in 
the corporate sector over the past period. Furthermore, 
credit conditions are anticipated to remain tight. Combined 
with the above-mentioned bleak expectations, this suggests 
a historically low investment rate in most sectors in the 
short run. This is only partially offset by investment 
projects in the automobile industry, which are also likely to 
continue over the coming quarters. Aside from the impact 
of large investments, corporate investments will in effect 
only consist of amortisation replacement. Household 
investments may reach a trough in 2012, and perk up 
somewhat over our forecast horizon. This trend may be 
supported by the government’s new housing loan scheme.
Chart 1-7
Developments in the export market share
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our forecast for lending to corporations
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Chart 1-8
use of household income
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Lending both to the corporate and to the household sector 
may be moderate in the next years as loan redemption will 
exceed borrowing over the entire horizon. Beside weak 
credit demand indicated by unfavourable outlook for 
economic growth, credit supply constraints have also 
become tighter. The central bank instruments engineered 
to improve banks’ lending capacity may exert their 
beneficial effects as lending picks up. Over the short term 
financial intermediaries’ willingness to lend may remain a 
barrier to lending, as a result of which credit conditions 
may only ease from 2013 (chart 1-9, 1-10).
The potential rate of economic growth may also significantly 
lag behind its pre-crisis rate in the coming years. One of the 
reason for this is that the potential growth rate of Hungary’s 
export markets has been declining, which has a negative 
effect on Hungary’s long-term economic growth rate. On 
the supply side, the uncertain outlook for economic activity 
and tight lending conditions point to a persistently sluggish 
private investment activity.
Chart 1-10
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Our view on fiscal policy may change significantly in the months to come. The reason for this is that exit from the Excessive Deficit 
procedure (eDp) and meeting the government’s own deficit targets for 2012 and 2013 will require further deficit reducing measures. 
In the absence of quantifiable measures, however, we do not expect any adjustment to our baseline scenario.
according to our baseline assumptions, GDp-proportional deficits of 3.1 percent and 3.4 percent are expected in 2012 and 2103 (see 
chapter 5.3.), respectively, provided that all reserves are cancelled. Thus, in order for the government’s deficit targets to be met, 
further adjustment of 0.5 percent and 0.6 percent will be called for this year and in 2013, respectively. a 0.5 percent adjustment in 
2012 will also satisfy the condition of exit from eDp set by the european commission in early march and guarantee, in line with the 
Comission’s criteria, an ESA deficit below 3 percent.
The impact of the possible measures on macroeconomic developments is determined by their actual form, size and structural nature. 
If the government intends to reduce the deficit mainly through increasing indirect taxes and the discontinuation of direct or indirect 
price subsidies, the relevant package may generate a sizeable inflationary pressure already in the short term; however, there will be 
no change in the underlying inflationary processes as determined by supply and demand. If, however, the adjustment takes the form 
of expenditure cuts and measures which increase revenues without directly influencing prices, then the resulting negative fiscal 
impulse may translate into a reduction in domestic demand and the widening of the output gap. This, in turn, may mitigate inflation. 
The impact of an adjustment package on macroeconomic developments and monetary policy will also depend on how markets respond 
to the measures. If, in the opinion of market actors, the adjustment is predominantly structural, and relies on measures that can 
guarantee a lasting reduction in the deficit, then announcements may lead to lower risk premiums, i.e. a stronger forint and lower 
yields.
The government has not yet made any announcement which could form the basis for quantifying the impact of the measures. 
nevertheless, government decree no. 1036/2012 published in february and adopted by the government in order to secure compliance 
with the fiscal deficit targets for 2012 and 2013 offers a glimpse into the intentions of the decision makers. according to the decree, 
the government is striving to reduce the deficit through the reduction of subsidies on medicine, a cutback of central budget subsidies 
granted to the BKV (Budapest transport), the July 2013 introduction of e-toll (electronic road usage fee) and a reduction in the 
Box 1-1
the probable macroeconomic effects of expected fiscal measures aim to hold the 2012−2013 deficit target
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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expenditures of budgetary chapters and entities. The government decree does not specify the expenditure reductions or revenue 
increases expected in particular areas. If the government wishes to achieve the 0.5 percent adjustment in a manner only affecting the 
above areas, then prices of medicines, tickets and fares will rise in response to the reduction of subsidies. This may lead to a 
substantial increase of inflation in the short run.
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In response to the adopted and the planned tightening 
measures affecting disability retirement and old-age 
pension, labour supply may continue to expand over our 
forecast horizon. However, employment is still determined 
by the unfavourable outlook for economic growth and 
therefore we expect employment to decline in the short 
run. A considerable increase in employment is also not 
anticipated in 2013 either. the government’s public 
employment scheme may alleviate the impact of 
unfavourable growth prospects, particularly in regions with 
high unemployment and low employment opportunities. 
Overall, unemployment may become stuck at a high level 
over the entire forecast horizon (Chart 1-11). 
The effect of the increase in the minimum wage, the 
guaranteed minimum wage, and the mandatory wage 
increases on wage costs is largely offset by the transformation 
of the tax credit scheme into a tax benefit scheme (wage 
compensation) in 2012. however, as state compensation will 
start to decrease from 2013, so will corporations’ profit. 
Altogether, the adopted measures will lead to an increase 
in costs for private sector corporations equal to 1 per cent 
of the total wage costs.1 However, corporations have more 
room for manoeuvre to mitigate the adverse effects of the 
shock than we previously assumed. The required increase in 
wages applies only to regular wages, therefore, corporations 
can offset increase in regular wages by reducing their non-
regular benefits (e.g. bonus and fringe benefits). 
Furthermore, these measures mainly affect low-income 
employees, and therefore employers can mitigate the 
effect of increasing wage costs by granting a more moderate 
increase in wages to higher income employees. This is 
confirmed by the results of the survey of Hay Group in 
1.3  labour market forecast
The outlook for the labour market is influenced by the government’s measures intended to boost activity, uncertain growth 
and weak labour demand due to increased burden on corporations. Consistent with the outlook for economic activity, the 
labour market is expected to remain slack over the long term. The increase in the minimum wage and mandatory wage 
increases may temporarily lead to accelerating wage growth in 2012, but as unemployment will remain high for a sustained 
period, wage dynamics may return to a more moderate pace from 2013.
Chart 1-11
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1  It is assumed that gross wages would rise by 4 percent apart from the effects of minimum wage hike while inflation remains above 5 percent. Resorting 
to the wage compensation, the affected corporations’ wage bill will increase by 5 percent. Those firms that cannot bear these costs may additionally 
apply for auxiliary compensation.
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January 2012 (chart 1-13). the surveyed corporations intend 
to raise the wages most for lower income administrative 
and blue-collar workers while wage growth of mid-level and 
senior executives may be moderate. Corporations 
contemplate laying off almost no workers as a result of the 
minimum wage hike. 
Due to poor outlook for growth, we expect labour market 
conditions to remain permanently slack over the entire 
forecast horizon. Thus, although the measures introduced 
by the government may lead to a higher wage index in 2012, 
wage growth is anticipated to rise moderately next year. 
Real wages may increase at a slower pace than productivity 
(chart 1-12).
table 1-12
productivity and real labour costs in the private sector
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Chart 1-13
How does the minimum wage hike influence the corporate 
wage policy in 2012
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table 1-2
Changes in our projections compared to the previous Inflation report
2011 2012 2013
fact
projection
December Current December Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.7 4.6 5.3 2.4 2.9
Core inflation without indirect tax 
effects
2.5 2.7 3.0 2.1 2.7
Consumer price index 3.9 5.0 5.6 2.6 3.0
economic growth
External demand (GDP-based)2 2.8 0.9 0.9 1.9 1.8
Household consumer expenditure 0.0 −0.7 −0.9 0.2 0.2
Government final consumption 
expenditure
0.4 −2.9 −3.6 −1.2 −0.6
Fixed capital formation −5.4 −1.4 −1.4 1.9 1.8
Domestic absorption −0.5 −1.3 −1.5 0.2 0.3
Export 8.4 6.3 5.8 9.2 8.7
Import 6.3 5.5 4.6 8.6 8.2
GDP 1.7 0.1 0.1 1.6 1.5
external balance
Current account balance 1.6 3.8 3.1 4.5 3.7
External financing capacity 3.6 6.4 5.7 7.8 7.0
Government balance3
ESA balance 4.2 −3.7 (−2.8) −4.0 (−3.1) −3.9 (−3.0) −4.3 (−3.4)
labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 5.0 3.6 3.1 2.9 3.1
Whole-economy employment5 0.8 2.9 1.8 0.2 0.7
Private sector gross average earnings6 5.3 7.1 6.5 3.8 4.1
Private sector employment5 1.4 −0.2 −0.1 0.3 0.5
Private sector unit labour cost5, 7 5.0 4.9 3.8 3.0 3.5
Household real income8 1.6 −1.2 −2.2 −0.1 −0.1
1 From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB.
2 In line with the changes in Hungarian export structure by destination countries we revised the weights in our external demand indicator. 
3 As a percentage of GDP. Data in parenthesis include cancellation of free central reserves.
4 Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
5 According to the CSO LFS data.
6 According to the original CSO data for full-time employees.
7 Private sector unit labour costs calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
8 MNB estimate. In our current forecast we have corrected the data of household income with the effect of changes in net equity because of payments 
into mandatory private pension funds.
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table 1-3
MnB basic forecast compared to other forecasts
2012 2013 2014
Consumer price Index (annual average growth rate, %)
mnB (march 2012) 5.6 3.0 − 
consensus economics (march 2012)1 5.0 − 5.3 − 5.8 2.5 − 3.2 − 4.0 3.2
european commission (february 2012) 5.1 4.1* − 
imf (January 2012) 5.0 3.7 − 
oecD (november 2011) 4.9 2.9 − 
reuters survey (march  2012)1 5.2 − 5.5 − 6.2 2.5 − 3.3 − 4.2 2.8 − 3.2 − 3.6
GDp (annual growth rate, %)
mnB (march 2012) 0.1 1.5 − 
consensus economics (march 2012)1 (−1.5) − (−0.4) − 0.5 0.5 − 1.5 − 2.5 2.2
european commission (february 2012) −0.1 1.4* − 
imf (January 2012) 0.3 1.5 − 
oecD (november 2011) −0.6 1.1 − 
reuters survey (march  2012)1 (−1.5) − (−0.3) − 0.5 0.6 − 1.4 − 2.5 − 
Current account balance (percent of GDp)
mnB (march 2012) 3.1 3.7 − 
european commission (november 2010) 3.2 3.8 − 
imf (January 2012) 2.2 1.1 − 
oecD (november 2011) 1.4 1.2 − 
Budget Balance (eSa-95 method, percent of GDp)
mnB (march 2012)4 − 4.0 (−3.1) −4.3 (−3.4) − 
consensus economics (march 2012)1 (−2.8) − (−3.3) − (−4.8) (−2.5) − (−3.1) − (−4.4) − 
european commission (november 2011) −2.8 −3.7 − 
imf (January 2012) −3.5 −3.7 − 
oecD (november 2011) −3.4 −3.3 − 
reuters survey (march  2012)1 (−2.5) − (−3.1) − (−4.5) (−2.2) − (−3.1) − (−4.6) − 
forecasts on the size of Hungary’s export markets (annual growth rate, %)
mnB (march 2012) 2.9 5.6 − 
european commission (november 2011)2 3.8 5.7 − 
imf (January 2012)2 4.5 4.9 − 
oecD (november 2011)2 3.0 5.4 − 
forecasts on the GDp growth rate of Hungary’s trade partners (annual growth rate, %)
mnB (march 2012) 0.9 1.8 − 
consensus economics (march 2012)1 0.8 1.9 − 
european commission (february 2012)2 0.8 2.0* − 
imf (January 2012)2 0.7 1.8 − 
oecD (november 2011)2 1.1 2.2 − 
forecasts on the GDp growth rate of euro area (annual growth rate, %)
consensus economics (march 2012)3 0.1 1.2 − 
european commission (november 2011) 0.7 1.4 − 
imf (January 2012) −0.3 1.1 − 
oecD (november 2011) 0.4 1.6 − 
1 For Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys, in addition to the average value of the analysed replies (i.e. the medium value), we also indicate the 
lowest and the highest values to illustrate the distribution of the data. 
2 Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions for the relevant countries are adjusted with the weighting system of the 
MNB, which is also used for the calculation of the bank’s own external demand indices. Certain institutions do not prepare forecast for all partner 
countries.
3 Aggregate based on Euro area members included in our external demand indices.
4 As a percentage of GDP. Data in parenthesis include cancellation of free central reserves.   
* November 2011 forecast.
Sources: Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics Inc. [London], February 2012, November 2011); European Commission Economic 
Forecasts (February 2012, November 2011); IMF World Economic Outlook Database (January 2012, September 2011); IMF Country Report No 12/13 
(January 2012) Reuters survey (March 2012); OECD Economic Outlook No. 90 (November 2011).
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Due to concerns regarding the financing of public debt, the 
high level of foreign currency exposure of both the private 
and public sectors as well as the risks associated with the 
financial sector, Hungary’s risk premium has been 
permanently high since the beginning of the financial crisis. 
In our forecast we assume that domestic economic agents’ 
balance sheet adjustment will continue to go on. This 
process could be prolonged for years, thus the economy’s 
vulnerability as well as risk premiums could decrease only 
at a more gradual pace. Risks associated with the financing 
ability of public debt could significantly be moderated by 
the agreement between the government, the European 
Commission and the IMF. The future evolution of Hungary’s 
risk perception remains surrounded by many uncertainties, 
which can result in higher, but also lower risk premiums 
during the forecast horizon than those assumed in the 
baseline scenario. 
In the first of the scenarios related to the evolution of 
Hungary’s risk assessment, we assume a faster improvement 
of the risk premium relative to that in the baseline scenario. 
The scenario’s probability of occurrence would be increased 
if the agreement between the government, the European 
Commission and the IMF materialized earlier and as a 
consequence risks associated with the financing of public 
debt were already moderated in the shorter term. Domestic 
financial assets risk assessment could also be better than in 
the baseline forecast in case the European financial 
environment improved further and global risk appetite 
increased. The lower risk premium could aid domestic 
economic recovery, and at the same time, through an 
appreciation of the Forint’s exchange rate would result in a 
moderation of inflationary pressure. A more rapid 
moderation of Hungary’s country risk, therefore, allows for 
2  effects of alternative scenarios on 
our forecast
In the followings three alternative scenarios − considered as the most relevant by the Monetary Council- are presented to 
illustrate the risks corresponding to the baseline scenario. In the first two scenarios we illustrate the two-way risks related 
to Hungary’s risk perception, while the third shows the consequences of higher oil prices than those forecasted in the 
baseline scenario. While a more rapid improvement in risk assessment relative to that assumed in the baseline scenario, 
enable an earlier − already in 2012 − start to a gradual interest rate decrease, risk perception remaining high for a more 
prolonged time period and the higher oil price path contribute to the build-up of inflationary pressure necessitating 
monetary conditions to be maintained at the prevailing level for a more prolonged period.
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an earlier − already in 2012 − start to a gradual base rate 
cut.
In the prevailing more volatile financial environment there 
is also a non-negligible risk of the Hungarian risk premium 
getting stuck at its current higher level for a more prolonged 
time. This could be a consequence if uncertainties regarding 
the financing of public debt prevailed for a longer time, and 
if global risk appetite were to become more moderate. The 
persistently higher premium adversely affects domestic 
economic growth prospects, and at the same time, through 
a depreciation of the Forint’s exchange rate would result in 
higher inflation. The worsened inflation outlook necessitates 
the maintaining of monetary conditions at their current 
level for a longer time period, and a significant decrease of 
the base rates would not be feasible in the second half of 
the forecast horizon even.
In our baseline scenario we have assumed that, in line with 
futures’ prices, oil prices follow a decreasing trend during 
the course of the forecast horizon. This decreasing trend of 
oil prices could, however, be substantially jeopardized by 
the realization of geo-political risks − such as realization of 
the oil embargo against Iran. In such a case oil supply could 
substantially contract which would result in oil prices 
sustaining their current, relatively high price level. If oil 
prices remain at this higher level for a more prolonged 
period, this would substantially worsen inflation outlook. To 
counterbalance such an effect, the current monetary 
conditions would need to prevail until the end of the 
forecast period. The tighter monetary conditions would 
result in a more appreciated exchange rate than that 
forecasted in the baseline scenario and at the same time, 
in line with higher oil prices, would contribute to a slower 
closing of the output gap (chart 2-1, 2-2).
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the effect of the alternative scenarios on our CpI forecast
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the effect of the alternative scenarios on our GDp forecast
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3.1.1 DevelopMentS In tHe GloBal 
eConoMy
Developments in the global economy are predominantly 
shaped by the debt problems in the euro area and the 
measures being implemented to resolve them. Government 
debt − weighted in proportion to GDp − in developed 
countries has increased dynamically since 2008; preliminary 
IMF estimates suggest that debt rose to 103.5 per cent in 
2011. this is primarily attributed to fiscal stimulus measures 
applied in the first phase of the crisis, bank consolidation 
and the use of automatic stabilisers. In reaction to the 
European sovereign debt crisis, strict fiscal measures have 
mainly been applied in euro area member states since May 
2010. austerity measures resulted in worsening demand 
conditions. However, fiscal positions and the effectiveness 
of the consolidations show major differences. Fiscal 
austerity may substantially slow economic growth via 
aggregate demand. According to the end January forecasts 
of the IMF, the GDP-proportionate budget deficit may 
decrease below 3 per cent in Germany and Italy, while 
additional major adjustments are necessary in France and 
Spain (Chart 3-1). 
3  Macroeconomic overview
3.1  International environment
During recent quarters the global environment has been characterised by worsening demand conditions and uncertainty 
surrounding the economic outlook. The deteriorating global economic environment affected different regions in various 
degrees. The economic climate continued to improve gradually in the USA and Germany, while the deepening of the euro-
area debt problems contributed to a decline in demand in several euro area countries. In developed economies, the large-
scale fiscal adjustments targeting sustainable government debt and the continued downsizing of balance sheets in the 
private sector may cause a slowdown in growth this year.
The effect of weakening global economic activity is also reflected in inflationary trends. Following the acceleration 
measured during the past year, the inflation rate in developed economies has been decelerating in recent months. The 
deterioration in global growth prospects interrupted the rapid rise of prices on the main commodity markets, although 
substantial price decreases are not expected in the short term. This can be attributed to the fact that geopolitical risks 
may have strengthened in recent quarters, in parallel with rapid growth witnessed in developing economies, where demand 
for specific resources is higher. In line with these trends, the global inflation of processed products may generally remain 
subdued, although a substantial adjustment of commodity prices (crude oil, natural gas, unprocessed food), which play a 
key role in determining domestic inflation, is not expected, despite the worsening growth prospects. Commodity prices 
may remain at high levels over the longer term.
Chart 3-1
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Measures targeting the fiscal consolidation are gaining 
emphasis in developed economies outside of the euro area 
as well. Debt sustainability risks are already visible in Japan 
and the USA, although financing problems have been 
avoided so far-, and thus it is possible to pursue an economic 
policy based on looser fiscal conditions than that of the 
international average. Over the medium term, however, 
structural adjustments to the budgets of these countries 
may be necessary to arrest the growth of government debt.
In addition to fiscal austerity and debt stabilisation 
measures, growth prospects are also substantially affected 
by the deleveraging of european banks (chart 3-2). Weak 
lending in the developed region principally affects Europe, 
where tensions in the banking sector at the end of last year 
led to worries about a possible credit crunch (Chart 3-3). 
Tensions within the banking sector eased early in the year 
due to the recently implemented measures of the ECB, but, 
deleveraging in the euro area continues, similarly to other 
developed regions. Lending may slow in emerging regions as 
a result of large volume cross-border withdrawals to related 
the large European banks, which may particularly hit South 
America and Central and Eastern Europe this year. Inflows 
of portfolio capital, however, have strengthened because of 
the liquidity facilities of developed central banks; problems 
may arise in connection with the flow of working capital.
Economic growth in the euro area decelerated substantially 
in 2011 h2. owing to worsening business and household 
confidence, as well as liquidity problems in the banking 
sector, the region came close to a recession by the end of 
2011 and early 2012. among the major economies, only 
france recorded growth in 2011 Q4. Weakening exports may 
Chart 3-2
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MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
have played a key role in the 0.2 per cent downturn of the 
German economy. Economies implementing the largest 
fiscal adjustments − e.g. italy, Spain − are likely to remain 
in a recession in 2012. most forecasts suggest that the 
German economy may grow this year, but the rate of growth 
will remain moderate due to slack global demand.
Economies outside of Europe show a slightly more favourable 
economic picture. After a poor start to the year, the growth 
in the uS economy picked up by the end of 2011; 
employment and household consumption also moved on a 
favourable trend. According to the most recent Beige Book 
of the Fed, industrial production and retail trade increased 
this year, while the labour market and the housing market 
conditions moderately improved. The report underlines the 
fact that robust growth characterised the automobile and 
steel industries early in the year. The recovery in the 
Japanese economy following the earthquake in march 2011 
was restrained by the slowdown in global trade and supply 
problems caused by the floods in Thailand at the end of 
2011. positive industrial production figures in December and 
improving confidence indicators, however, suggest that 
economic activity may improve at the beginning of 2012. 
Growth in China is gradually slowing, as the annual rate of 
growth fell below 9 per cent in 2011 Q4. along with stricter 
fiscal and monetary policy, real estate market regulatory 
measures have led to a gradual slowdown in investment 
activity. Moreover, weakening demand in the global 
economy decreased exports as well. In line with the above 
trend, the Chinese government reduced this year’s growth 
target to 7.5 per cent.
Although the recently published Q4 growth data reveal 
weakening economic performance in many countries, 
several confidence indicators suggest that global economic 
Chart 3-4
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activity may recover in the coming quarters (Chart 3-4). 
The interest rate cuts and coordinated liquidity injections 
of the ECB in November, December and February, and the 
curbing of the debt crisis may have supported the 
stabilisation of business and household confidence in 
European countries. 
Global economic growth, however, may remain modest in 
the medium term. The balance sheet adjustments of 
indebted households and budget deficit cuts in developed 
economies may narrow demand for a prolonged period. 
Developing economies has grown dynamically since the 
crisis, but the weaker performance of developed countries 
may negatively affect them through trade ties. In addition, 
domestic demand may worsen in China, particularly on the 
real estate market. Thus, growth may fall short of the 
historical average in 2013 as well.
3.1.2  GloBal InflatIonary trenDS
The gloomy global economic growth prospects are also 
reflected by inflationary trends. More pessimistic growth 
prospects have moderated inflation fears. Commodity 
prices declined in 2011 h2, in parallel with fading growth 
prospects, contributing to a stabilisation in the prices of 
industrial goods on the global market. In relation to 
agricultural raw materials, favourable harvests also 
supported falling prices. Prices of both metals and food 
commodities increased moderately in early 2012, but this 
increase does not represent an inflationary risk due to the 
falling prices in the previous year (Chart 3-5). 
The price of oil has continued to rise in recent months, 
presumably due to mounting geopolitical tensions. The 
European Union and the USA are planning an oil embargo 
against Iran, in response to the country’s continued nuclear 
programme. Domestic tensions in several Arab countries 
are also interrupting production. Finally, analysts argue that 
due to growing government expenditures, Arab countries 
are able to sustain fiscal stability only with higher oil prices, 
which may also pose a limit to reducing oil prices in a 
period of recession. Owing to the above factors, the 18 per 
cent increase of the price of Brent crude oil since mid-
December exceeds the average price increase of 
commodities, as the price rose to uSD 125 by the end of 
February. Forward quotes this year indicate a stabilisation 
of the Brent oil price at approximately uSD 120 (chart 3-6).
Since the effects of the cost shocks ceased, inflation 
declined in most economies at the end of 2011. looking to 
the future, surplus capacities in developed economies may 
lead to a further decline in inflation in 2012 and 2013. 
Growth has also slowed in several, previously overheated 
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developing economies, particularly in China, which may 
support slowing inflation in commodity prices (Chart 3-7).
3.1.3  DevelopMentS In Monetary 
polICy
The deterioration of the global economic outlook and 
waning inflation risks in recent months are also reflected by 
the interest rate decisions of central banks around the 
world. The main central banks of the world have basically 
implemented a zero base rate; the sole exception, the ECB, 
has cut the base rate in two steps, by a total of 50 basis 
points to 1 per cent since October. The Governing Council 
explained the cuts on the grounds that inflationary pressure 
is low on the wage, price and cost side over the monetary 
policy decision horizon. In the survey of Consensus 
Economics, conducted directly before the interest rate 
cuts, market expectations were consistent with a 25-basis 
point cut by the end of 2011, and a further decrease of the 
interest rate was only minimally anticipated in 2012. 
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table 3-1
nonconventinal monetary policy tools in the Cee region during the crisis
Country nonconventional monetary policy measures in the Cee region
Czeh Republic
Since the 15th oct. 2008 2 weeks maturity credit facility, interest rate of the base rate + 10 bps 
Since the 20th nov. 2008 3 month maturity credit facility, interest rate of the base rate + 30 bps 
2 weeks and 3 months fX-swaps  (the 3 month tool ended in 2010)
Poland
Long term credit facility (the longest maturity was 1 year)
FX-swap tenders
Relaxed eligibility criteria
EUR/CHF swap agreement with the Swiss National Bank
10 billion euro repoline facility with the ECB
Romania reducing the reserve requirements (from 20% to 15% for ron)
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Following the interest rate decisions, analysts expected a 
significantly lower interest rate path of approximately 40 
basis points less in January 2012. an interest rate increase 
is only expected in 2013 based on the yield curve derived 
from Euribor forwards. In developed countries outside of 
the euro area, central banks in Australia, Israel, Norway and 
Sweden also cut their base rates. 
Due to dampened economic expectations, central banks in 
countries applying a zero base rate aimed to ease monetary 
conditions with unconventional monetary policy measures. 
The Japanese central bank increased the overall amount of 
its asset purchase programme to 55 trillion yen and 65 
trillion yen (12.1 per cent of 2010 GDp) in october and 
February, respectively. It was argued that growth in 
Japanese economy had stalled by the end of the year, 
despite rising domestic demand. The negative trend 
predominantly affected declining exports and industrial 
production attributed to European recessionary expectations 
and the flood in Thailand. The British central bank 
increased its asset purchases by 50 billion pounds in 
October and by an additional 75 billion pounds in early 
february, equalling a total of 325 billion British pounds 
(22.3 per cent of 2010 GDp). the decisions were said to be 
necessary due to the declining economic activity, as the 
medium-term 2 per cent inflation target would probably be 
undershot without further monetary easing. Markets still do 
not rule out the announcement of third quantitative easing 
programme by the Fed.
Both the Fed and the Japanese central bank announced an 
official inflation target in recent months. At the end of 
January, the Fed announced that in the future it aims to 
fulfil its triple mandate (price stability, maximum 
employment, low long-term interest rates) by introducing 
an explicit, long-term inflation target. It set the inflation 
target at a 2 per cent level with the personal consumption 
expenditures price index. It was argued that the 
communicated inflation target supports the stringent 
anchoring of long-term inflationary expectations, which 
enhances the ability of monetary policy to promote 
maximum employment through moderate long-term interest 
rates. The Japanese central bank announced a 1 per cent 
inflation target for the medium and long term. Japan has 
witnessed continuous deflationary problems since the end 
of the 1990s, and therefore the modification of monetary 
policy in the direction an inflation targeting regime would 
seem a reasonable step in its case. 
3.1.4  fInanCIal MarketS
Due to deepening and contagion of the debt crisis, by the 
end of 2011 the european banking sector faced mounting 
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Interbank and swap market spreads
−180
−160
−140
−120
−100
−80
−60
−40
−20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 
Se
p.
 1
1
12
 S
ep
. 
11
21
 S
ep
. 
11
30
 S
ep
. 
11
11
 O
ct
. 
11
20
 O
ct
. 
11
31
 O
ct
. 
11
9 
N
ov
. 
11
18
 N
ov
. 
11
29
 n
ov
. 
11
8 
D
ec
. 
11
19
 D
ec
. 
11
29
 D
ec
. 
11
10
 J
an
. 
12
19
 J
an
. 
12
30
 J
an
. 
12
8 
Fe
b.
 1
2
17
 F
eb
. 
12
28
 F
eb
. 
12
8 
M
ar
. 
12
19
 M
ar
. 
12
Basis pointsBasis points
EURIBOR-OIS spread
EUR/USD 3 month basis swap spread (right-hand scale)
Source: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters.
Chart 3-9
Main stock market indices
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
20
25
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 
Se
p.
 1
1
12
 S
ep
. 
11
21
 S
ep
. 
11
30
 S
ep
. 
11
11
 O
ct
. 
11
20
 O
ct
. 
11
31
 O
ct
. 
11
9 
N
ov
. 
11
18
 N
ov
. 
11
29
 N
ov
. 
11
8 
D
ec
. 
11
19
 D
ec
. 
11
28
 D
ec
. 
11
6 
Ja
n.
 1
2
17
 J
an
. 
12
26
 J
an
. 
12
6 
Fe
b.
 1
2
15
 F
eb
. 
12
24
 F
eb
. 
12
6 
M
ar
. 
12
15
 M
ar
. 
12
Frankfurt (DAX)
SP 500
Tokio (NIKKEI)
Per cent Per cent
Source: Bloomberg.
Quarterly report on inflation • march 2012 33
MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
liquidity tensions, its capital adequacy worsened and the 
risk of possible capital losses increased significantly. The 
ECB attempted to ease these tensions primarily by sustaining 
financial stability and improving the commercial banking 
channel and announced the application of an additional 
coordinated instrument scheme. on 3 november 2011, the 
ECB announced details of the second covered bond purchase 
programme (cBpp 2). in the framework of the programme, 
the ECB will purchase bonds in the total value of 40 billion 
euro. The asset purchase programme was launched in 
november 2011 and is expected to be completed in october 
2012 at the latest. the central banks of developed countries 
launched a coordinated action at the end of November to 
manage US dollar funding disruptions. They reduced the 
costs of the outstanding US dollar swap funds as of 
December 5 (oiS + 50 basis points, previously oiS + 100 
basis points) and announced they would continue the 
campaign until february 2013.
The ECB announced its new 3-year credit instrument (LTRO) 
in December 2011 and in february 2012, which was used by 
euro-area banks in an amount of eur 489 billion and 529 
billion euro respectively. Regarding the effects of the LTRO 
there is a consensus that it has significantly decreased 
tensions in the European financial markets. The credit 
facility supported the euro-area banks to a healthier 
balance sheet structure and cheaper longer-term financing 
that does not contain term premium; financial institutions 
were hardly were able to obtain low-cost long term 
financing with bad quality collaterals as securities which 
can be used as collaterals on the market only with high 
haircuts or cannot even be used as collaterals at all. 
However, the LTRO cannot really remedy the banks’ balance 
sheet problems caused by low quality assets which cannot 
be used for repo transactions. Furthermore, the LTRO may 
be neutral in terms of financing needs, as it is almost 
equivalent with rolling a position of short-term ECB credit 
facilities.
The central bank measures recently announced on 
developed markets have improved liquidity, but are unable 
to substantially influence balance sheet downsizing in the 
public sector and the European banking sector. Market 
confidence has improved mildly as growth worries have 
eased easing since December and the European debt crisis 
also eased. Relief on the markets was supported by the 
coordinated steps of the ECB, the Fed's communications 
with an emphasis on loose monetary conditions in the long 
term and expansion of the quantitative easing programme 
by the Japanese central bank. Easing tensions in the 
European banking sector and the smaller than expected 
decline in lending moderated previous recession fears. The 
instruments of the ECB applied since early November 
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significantly eased tensions on the market of covered 
bonds and led to a yield decrease not witnessed since the 
beginning of the debt crisis. The instruments substantially 
improved liquidity tensions peaking at the end of the year 
in the European banking sector. Thanks to the successful 
three-year ECB credit facility, money market conditions 
improved significantly and long-term yields declined on the 
government securities market in the peripheral countries 
of the euro area. 
The improved position of the European banking sector and 
reduced risks have led to improved sentiment on the 
financial markets in recent months. The narrowing of the 
EURIBOR-OIS spread suggests strengthening interbank 
confidence, while the significant decrease of the 3-month 
euro/dollar based swap spread indicates the easing of US 
dollar liquidity tensions in the euro-area banking sector. 
Owing to optimistic sentiment, stock market indices in the 
leading developed and emerging markets have produced 
substantial growth of over 15-20 per cent since December. 
the ViX index fell from 23 to 16 per cent and the emBi yield 
index decreased by 100 basis points, suggesting that 
improving sentiment also positively affected the risk 
perception of sovereign debtors on emerging markets. The 
euro appreciated by 1 per cent against the US dollar and by 
7 per cent against the yen in reaction to strengthening 
global risk tolerance and temporary resolution of the Greek 
crisis. For the time being, the Swiss central bank is 
maintaining the exchange rate limit set in September of last 
year, thus the franc/euro exchange rate hovered around the 
1.2 level for most of the period.
Concerns related to the debt crisis in the euro area and the 
withdrawals of fundings of global banks remain a negative 
risk underlying global investor sentiment. Reduced 
uncertainties relating to the Greek bond exchange 
programme and the new IMF-EU bail-out package may 
further improve money market sentiment, but the 
management of Greek government debt over the medium 
term remains a negative risk. Tensions on the European 
money markets have abated significantly since mid-
December, although longer-term global economic trends 
continue to be determined by the motivation to downsize 
balance sheets.
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The adjustment and elimination of the imbalances which built up before the crisis, is a prolonged process. Balance sheet adjustments 
within the banking sector, particularly in relation to European banks, have accelerated since the end of last year and is part of this 
process. according to the latest BiS international banking statistics (data on 2011 Q3), european banks have withdrawn large volumes 
of funds from emerging countries since September, particularly from the Central and Eastern European region. This was possible last 
year due to the relatively high liquidity of subsidiary banks (compared to the situation at the end of 2008 and in 2009). the cross-border 
withdrawals of funds further worsens the growth outlook of the affected regions. Due to balance sheet downsizing, central banks in 
Eastern Europe, South America and Asia have been forced to apply liquidity-providing measures. The provision of liquidity may be 
necessary, as the rapid pace of withdrawn funds may cause disruptions on the FX swap market, which may lead to liquidity tensions 
on the local financial markets. 
The withdrawal of funds is partly attributable to the capital adequacy rule of the European Banking Authority announced in the autumn 
of 2011, prompting banks on the continent to reduce their exposure to emerging markets. on the basis of the international banking 
statistics of the BIS, balance sheet downsizing trends affect the exposure of European banks to emerging markets to a greater degree. 
European banks withdrew large volumes of funds from their subsidiaries in global emerging markets in the second half of the year, 
presumably on account of the liquidity disruptions and capital adequacy obligation. The withdrawal of funds is partly attributed to the 
9 per cent Tier 1 capital adequacy rule required by the European Banking Authority (EBA). This rule accelerated the reduction of the 
exposure of European banks with global interests on emerging markets, resulting in substantial capital withdrawals. The process 
predominantly affected the Eastern European and Mediterranean region, which accounts for roughly 60 per cent of the change in the 
cross-border bank claims of the euro-area banks. The cross-border claims of euro-area banks providing data to the BIS decreased 
significantly from Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Romania, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
The European Bank Coordination Initiative (“Vienna Initiative”) is also relevant in explaining capital flows in Central and Eastern 
europe, this agreement required european banks to maintain exposure relative to level measured in 2008 in countries signing an imf 
credit line agreement. (A 95 per cent minimum was determined for Hungary.) Accordingly, non-resident banks may not reduce their 
Eastern European exposure at a faster rate during the term of the IMF facility, and thus the agreement slows down balance sheet 
downsizing. there is growing demand in eastern europe for a new, similar agreement (Vienna initiative 2). Without such an initiative, 
the extention of new loans may decline in the Central European region at an even higher rate, which would further worsen growth 
prospects.
Box 3-1
Deleveraging in the european banking sector
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hungarian GDp showed stronger growth in 2011 Q4 than we 
had expected. Despite slowing growth experienced by 
Hungary's key foreign trading partners, the effect of 
external demand continued to play the key role in 
determining GDP. Domestic demand continued to 
underperform at the end of 2011. as in previous quarters, 
household consumption decreased further. Investments 
continued to decline, notwithstanding the large-scale 
automotive industry projects (Chart 3-13). 
3.2.1  foreIGn traDe
The economic activity of Hungary's main foreign trading 
partners continuously declined after 2011 Q1, negatively 
affecting sales of Hungarian export goods. Despite the 
worsening conditions, the volume of domestic export sales 
continued to show strong growth in the final months of the 
year. On account of stable robust Asian demand, the 
performance of automotive companies operating in Hungary 
was favourable throughout the year, as indicated by the 
dynamic growth in export sales. By contrast, the negative 
effects of reorganisation and factory closings in the past 
quarters were reflected by sales in the communications 
sector (Chart 3-14). 
Domestic exports were presumably also spurred by the 
weakening exchange rate at the end of the year. The 
agricultural and tourism sectors likely benefited from the 
positive short-term effects of this trend. Continuing weak 
domestic demand and worsening global economic prospects 
3.2  aggregate demand
Despite the slowdown in the global economy, the Hungarian economy exhibited stronger-than-expected growth in the 
fourth quarter. Growth continues to be characterised by a significant duality: the contribution of net exports to growth 
remains high, while overall domestic demand continues to be moderate. Household consumption may have moderately 
increased at the end of the year, presumably due to mainly temporary factors. Investments within the national economy 
continued to decline, albeit at a slower pace.
Improving demand conditions may also have contributed to the acceleration in core inflation and the higher-than–expected 
increases in consumer price at the beginning of the year. We believe that the rise in domestic demand at the end of 2011 
is temporary and that consumption is likely to decline again over the short term. The renewed weakening in demand 
conditions may continue to dampen the pass-through of high producer prices to consumer prices, supporting the gradual 
decrease of inflation, which was high in early 2012.
Chart 3-13
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caused a decline in import volumes, and thus net exports 
continued to substantially contribute to positive national 
GDP growth. Aside from the positive trends in sales 
volumes, the negative effects of rising and persistently high 
energy prices seen last year were also reflected by the 
continuous deterioration of the national terms in trade. As 
a result of worsening terms of trade, the trade surplus 
continuously declined in 2011 h2 (chart 3-15). 
The global economy may recover from its low in the first 
half of 2012, and thus we can expect a gradual growth in 
exports from the second quarter. The gradual start-up of 
production at the Mercedes factory in Kecskemét may also 
boost the volume of exports. This effect, however, is offset 
by the bankruptcy of Malév in the first quarter and the 
downsizing of Nokia’s production capacities.
3.2.2  HouSeHolD ConSuMptIon
Household consumption deteriorated further at the end of 
2011. macroeconomic indicators determining households’ 
consumption (employment, economic prospects, consumer 
confidence indicators, credit supply of the banking system) 
have not been improving in past months. The early 
repayment scheme announced for debtors with foreign 
currency loans and also the further tightened credit 
standards for households may have also worked against 
rising demand in the short term. The consumption-
stimulating effects of the programme are expected to 
materialise in the longer term. Since a large portion of 
participating households prepaid loans using own funds, this 
may have limited the year-end consumption of the 
households involved. For households not participating in the 
programme, depreciation of the exchange rate in recent 
quarters reduced income available for consumption. The 
option provided by the new fixed exchange rate programme 
introduced this year may ease the resulting tensions for 
those households. The fall in demand may have been 
mitigated by the prolonged effect of real yield payments in 
July, the December timing of year-end bonus payments, 
purchases brought forward due to the VAT increase in 
January, particularly in relation to durable industrial goods, 
and the weakening of the forint exchange rate in the final 
months of the year. The latter probably strengthened the 
demand of non-resident households (Chart 3-16).
household lending in 2011 Q4 was driven mainly by the early 
repayments of foreign currency loans. The net effect of the 
prepayments (gross amount less refinancing loans) amounted 
to HUF 550 billion. Early repayments affected both the 
reviewed product groups of the household segment; they 
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not only affected home loans, but also consumer loans 
including home equity loans (Chart 3-18).
In addition to early repayments, the decline in lending was 
significantly attributed to other causes as well. On the 
supply side, households faced tightened credit standards in 
terms of both price and non-price conditions. At the same 
time, household credit demand remains slack: the disposable 
income of households with foreign currency loans remains 
burdened by the strong Swiss franc, while households 
participating in the prepayment scheme are expected to 
build up earlier buffers over the short term, rather than 
drawing down new loans. Overall, the loan repayments of 
households continue to exceed the amount of newly 
disbursed loans, resulting in declining lending that surpasses 
the volume of early repayments.
We expect consumption to decline again in early 2012. 
Underlying household income trends continue to be weak. 
Higher-than-expected inflation and compensation for the 
minimum wage increases may strengthen the expected 
decrease of real incomes in the first months of this year. 
The low level of confidence indicators also suggests 
cautious consumer behaviour in the short term.
3.2.3  prIvate InveStMentS
The general macroeconomic environment did not stimulate 
investment activity in the past year. The low rate of 
investment is attributable to both demand and supply side 
factors. The deterioration of short-term growth prospects 
and the recurring decline in the use of capacities has 
prompted companies to take a cautious approach to 
investment, possibly resulting in a continued delay of 
investments. Lending by the banking sector is still tied to 
tight terms, and thus there is limited access to the funds 
necessary for investments. Furthermore, non-financial 
corporations may also prefer liquid assets due to the tight 
credit conditions of the banking sector (Chart 3-19).
While investments in sectors producing for external markets 
have increased primarily as a result of key large-scale 
investments in the manufacturing industry, sectors 
producing for the domestic market were mainly 
characterised by a decline in the fourth quarter again. 
Agricultural investments represent an exception to this, 
where − as a result of favourable performance in 2011 − 
there was more room to implement additional investments 
which are also in accordance with farming directives 
applied by the EU. 
Household investment continues to be characterised by a 
high level of caution and a wait-and-see approach. The key 
Chart 3-18
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indicators measuring the new home market reveal 
historically low activity on the housing market. The number 
of new home construction permits decreased in the second 
half of the past year, albeit by a very low rate, thus the 
national real estate market can gradually reach a low in the 
course of the next year (chart 3-20).
The lending activity of domestic financial intermediaries 
has further declined in the corporate segment in the last 
quarter of 2011. Both bank and non-bank lending decreased 
in the reviewed period, irrespective of product maturity. 
The lending capacity of the banking sector has significantly 
worsened in the past quarter, in relation to both the 
liquidity position and, through rising losses, the capital 
position as well. Beyond supply constraints, weak corporate 
lending is also attributable to demand factors, therefore 
the borrowing of long-term loans remains at a low level. 
Short-term lending (i.e. working capital financing) also 
decreased at a higher rate during the quarter, which is 
presumably correlated with the relatively low level of 
capacity utilisation. Short-term lending to companies in the 
manufacturing industry, which are performing strong within 
the export sector, was also characterised by a moderate 
decline in the period (chart 3-21).
Declining external demand, deteriorating domestic 
economic prospects and tight credit conditions within the 
domestic banking sector suggest that lending to domestic 
companies remains subdued, due to the joint contraction of 
demand and supply.
With poor economic prospects and continuously tight credit 
conditions, both corporate and household investments may 
remain weak in the first months of the year. A rise in 
investment is still expected in the manufacturing sector, as 
a result of the large scale automobile industry investments 
in progress.
3.2.4  InventorIeS
The level of inventories in the national economy may have 
been determined by conflicting trends. Uncertain demand 
prospects and continuously tight corporate credit standards 
may continue to result in activity characterised by tight, 
low inventory levels in a broad range of sectors. The 
earthquake in Japan and the floods in Thailand, however, 
caused inventory problems for many manufacturing 
companies in the middle of last year. On the other hand, 
outstanding agricultural harvests in 2011 may have positively 
contributed to the rise in inventories within the national 
economy. In conclusion, the change in inventories made a 
negative contribution to GDP growth in the fourth quarter 
(chart 3-23).
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3.2.5  GovernMent DeManD
Public consumption expenditure diminished in the fourth 
quarter. In line with the improvement of the budget 
balance, tight fiscal management has characterised direct 
government expenditures in the past quarters. The level of 
public employment has gradually declined in recent 
quarters, while government investments implemented in 
part with EU financing have moderately increased. The rise 
in investments is mainly attributable to the implementation 
of the “Vásárhelyi Plan” which targets river control projects 
(chart 3-24).
Chart 3-24
Changes in government consumption 
(2005−2011)
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Per cent (annual changes)
Social transfers in kind
Final consumption of government
Quarterly report on inflation • march 2012 41
national economic output increased in 2011 Q4, thus 
following the crisis the recovery of the Hungarian economy 
has been practically continuous since 2009, albeit at a 
slower pace in the past year. The level of economic output 
is currently still lower than in the years preceding the crisis. 
In addition to consistently strong industrial exports, crop 
yields significantly surpassed those registered in 2010 and 
this played a key role in promoting growth. As a result, the 
sector − which plays a minor role in terms of GDp − 
contributed approximately 1 percentage point to growth in 
2011 (chart 3-25).
The strong duality observed in the performance of the 
private sector during the entire recovery period moderately 
weakened in the past quarter. Demand on Hungary's main 
export markets is gradually declining, causing slower 
growth in industrial added value than earlier, while the 
added value of some domestic service sectors increased 
moderately in 2011 Q4, despite the prolonged weakness in 
domestic demand. 
following the adverse year of 2010 in agriculture, 
favourable weather conditions resulted in a substantial 
increase in harvests in 2011. in relation to almost all main 
plant crop, yields surpassed average yields for the past 10 
years. Favourable conditions not only resulted in a 
substantial rise in quantity, but also significantly improved 
the quality of crops, further increasing added value in the 
sector. Following the harvesting period, the weakening of 
the HUF/EUR exchange rate in the autumn months 
supported immediate sales. We do not yet have information 
available to assess crop yields expected this year (Chart 
3-26).
3.3  production and potential output
In the last quarter of 2011, the national economy output increased faster than we expected. In addition to consistently 
strong industrial exports, GDP growth is also attributed to the agricultural performance which was significantly more 
favourable than in 2010. Sectors producing for the domestic market are still failing to promote growth. The economy’s 
potential rate of growth may have recovered from the low last year, possibly followed by very slow, gradual growth.
The outstanding agricultural crop yields in 2011 contributed substantially to the normalisation of agricultural producer 
prices observed in the second half of last year thanks to growing supply, and this has also lowered domestic inflation in 
the past quarters.
Chart 3-25
Structure of changes in Hungarian annual GDp 
(2005−2011, %)
−8.0
−6.0
−4.0
−2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Per cent
Agriculture
Private sector
Government
GDP at market prices
Note: The value added of sectors at basic prices.
Chart 3-26
average yield of main field crops 
(kg/ha)
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
5,500
6,000
6,500
7,000
W
he
at
C
or
n
Ba
rl
ey
R
ye
O
at
Su
nf
lo
w
er
R
ap
e
Lu
ce
rn
e
Kg/ha
2010
2011
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
Quarterly report on inflation • march 201242
Growth in industrial production has continuously decreased 
since the middle of 2010. Sales in the sector, however, 
showed moderate growth in the final quarter of 2011. 
Domestic consumption, however, is still failings to promote 
industrial growth, and thus exports continue to be the main 
engine of industrial growth. The level of new orders in the 
sector points to a further slowdown in the growth of sales 
in the first months of this year (chart 3-27).
Declining output in the construction industry − which has 
been observed since 2006 − continued in 2011. the 
worsening trend, however, reversed in the final months of 
last year. Owing to government infrastructure projects (e.g. 
road and rail development), production in the sector 
moderately increased over the previous quarters. As a 
further positive sign, on the basis of contractual data on the 
sector, the number of new contracts concluded in December 
of last year increased by over 10 per cent for the first time 
in a long period. Despite the few positive trends, we expect 
production in the sector to moderately decline over the 
short term. Household investments on the housing market 
sank to a historical low, while companies may also wait and 
see with investment activity as the economic outlook 
worsens. Government projects implemented predominantly 
with EU funds will continue to support production in the 
sector (chart 3-28).
The performance of the commerce and catering sector at 
the end of 2011 was characterised by tangible growth. in 
addition to real yield payments made in the middle of the 
year, higher–than-expected bonus payments in December 
also supported the rise in retail sales. Beyond these effects, 
the weak forint exchange rate may have strengthened 
cross-border shopping tourism before the Christmas season.
The weak exchange rate also affected tourism. Owing to 
the reservations of foreigners at the end of the year, the 
number of guest nights considerably increased at various 
accommodation establishments. Capacities were particularly 
filled in luxury and wellness hotels, suggesting strengthening 
health and conference tourism. In view of restrained 
general domestic income trends, continuously tight credit 
standards and deteriorating domestic consumer confidence, 
the performance of the sector may show adjustment early 
this year (chart 3-29).
The added value of the financial sector further declined at 
the end of last year. Lending activity in the sector remains 
weak, while the deteriorating household and corporate 
portfolios produce additional losses. We are not expecting 
a reversal of the trend over the short term. In parallel with 
the continuous decline in new housing construction, the 
performance of the real estate sector also showed a gradual 
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production of industry, new orders and eSI confidence 
indicators of the industry
−3,0
−2,5
−2,0
−1,5
−1,0
−0,5
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Per centPer cent
Production of industy
New orders
ESI (right-hand scale)
Note: The ESI series is normalized.
Chart 3-28
production of construction, new orders and eSI confidence 
indicators of the construction sector 
−70
−50
−30
−10
10
30
50
−70
−50
−30
−10
10
30
50
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Balance indicatorPer cent
Production of construction
New orders
ESI (right-hand scale)
Chart 3-29
number of guest nights spent at commercial 
accommodation establishments
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
1,000
1,450
1,500
1,550
1,600
1,650
1,700
1,750
Ja
n.
 0
7
M
ay
 0
7
Se
p.
 0
7
Ja
n.
 0
8
M
ay
 0
8
Se
p.
 0
8
Ja
n.
 0
9
M
ay
 0
9
Se
p.
 0
9
Ja
n.
 1
0
M
ay
 1
0
Se
p.
 1
0
Ja
n.
 1
1
M
ay
 1
1
Se
p.
 1
1
Ja
n.
 1
2
Thousand nights Thousand nights
Total
Of which international (right-hand scale)
Quarterly report on inflation • march 2012 43
MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
downturn. The upturn in the sale of used homes related to 
total loan repayments in January may temporarily improve 
the performance of the sector in the first quarter of this 
year. On the basis of deteriorating consumer and business 
confidence indicators, the added value of the 
telecommunications sector − which is sensitive to domestic 
demand − and of other economic service sectors may also 
decline. A tangible rise in added value is only expected in 
the transport sector − which sensitive to industrial activity 
− in the first half of 2012.
With government expenditure cuts, and particularly the 
lay-offs in the public sector, government added value 
moderately decreased at the end of last year. Rationalisation 
of the government operation of the education and health 
system remains a key focal point of government plans, 
which may also limit added value in these sectors in the 
short term.
Our view of the potential level of output has not changed 
significantly since the December issue of the Report on 
Inflation. The continuously high level of corporate 
bankruptcies indicates a further decline in capital stocks 
(Chart 3-31). Although the amortisation rate of capital 
normalised again after the most intense phase of the crisis, 
the new capacity expanding investments are not yet able to 
support an increase in production capacities.
The continuous rise in labour supply observed in the past 
two years came to a halt in the final quarter. The ratio of 
long-term unemployed remains high, which continues to 
pose a risk to the renewed employment of those affected 
(Chart 3-30). The abilities of people who are out of a job 
over the long term will diminish, therefore they have 
greater difficulty in finding employment. The announced 
new government measures may contribute to a further rise 
in activity on the labour market from 2012, which may also 
moderately increase potential growth with the start-up of 
new automotive investments (chart 3-32).
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the labour force continued to grow in 2011 as the activity 
rate increased by 1 percentage point to 56 per cent (Chart 
3-33). the increase in activity since early 2010 may be 
primarily attributed to government measures implemented 
in previous years (particularly the raising of the retirement 
age and tightening of conditions of early retirement). The 
improving trend stalled in the past quarter, but may recover 
this year as a result of government measures aiming at the 
additional increase of activity (tightening disability 
retirement conditions, review of the entitlements of 
disability pensioners). The rise in activity predominantly 
affected the 45-59 age group, where rules relating to 
retirement have been tightened.
Labour demand in the national economy did not change 
significantly in 2011 Q4, similarly to the entire year (chart 
3-34). Subsidised jobs continue to make up most of demand 
for new labour, while new job vacancies in the private 
sector did not show any major change. The number of 
employees stagnated in the last quarter but it decreased 
significantly in January.
With the increasingly uncertain economic outlook, the 
private sector is marked by cautious employment decisions. 
In line with the stronger-than-expected Q4 GDP data in the 
last months of the year, a substantial rise in employment 
was only recorded in the accommodation industry. According 
to indicators available to us in relation to employment 
3.4  employment and labour market
The labour force continued to grow in 2011. Although the trend faltered in the final months of the year, government 
measures promoting a further rise in activity may result in continuation of the improving trend this year. In line with 
weakening economic prospects, labour demand in the private sector gradually declined in recent months, while the public 
employment gradually declined in line with the rationalisation of the expenditure side of the budget. The unemployment 
rate remained consistently over 10 per cent throughout the whole of 2011, and thus conditions on the labour market 
continue to be loose.
The loose labour market conditions may continue to limiting the rise in nominal wages. Administrative wage increases 
effected at the beginning of the year may accelerate wages, but upon filtering this effect, basic wage trends may be 
characterised by significantly slower dynamics compared to the average of the years before the crisis. In a weak demand 
environment, strong adjustment on the labour market side − which may also affect wage increases in addition to 
employment − in the coming quarters may dampen growing pressure on consumer prices attributed to the rise in other 
production costs.
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prospects, labour demand declined in early 2012, as is also 
confirmed by institutional statistics in January. The decline 
in the number of employees is mainly attributed to the 
smaller enterprises, which employ 5-50 workers. These 
companies are affected firstly by the deterioration in the 
economic climate but the January statistics are biased (see 
chapter 6.2 on the interpretation of labour market 
processes).
The number of employed in the private sector was also 
negatively affected by mass lay-offs announced by a few 
large companies at the beginning of the year (Malév, 
Budapest Airport, Nokia).A large portion of these dismissed 
employees appear on the labour market as jobseekers with 
high level qualifications and know-how, thus the probability 
of their re-employment is higher than average. 
Government employment, not including community service 
programmes, continuously declined in the course of the 
past year. The decline in the number of employed was 
particularly high in the health and public administration 
sectors. The declining trend was positively affected by 
temporary hiring related to the census in the last months of 
the year.
The number of people participating in the community 
service programmes significantly increased over the year 
2010. this effect, however, was not reflected by employment 
statistics due to the increasing weight of part-time 
employment and the decreasing period of employment. The 
number of people employed simultaneously in the 
programme has moderately decreased over the year 2010. 
Since the crisis, in more uncertain demand environments 
the need for more flexible forms of employment has 
increased (Chart 3-36). The ratio of part-time workers 
continues to be high, while the ratio of interim labour is 
showing a moderately downward trend since early 2011 in 
parallel with the worsening economic outlook. 
The unemployment rate did not change significantly in the 
previous year. The number of unemployed per job vacancy 
remains high. The labour market remains loose and the 
Beveridge curve has not shown major changes in the past 
quarters (Chart 3-37).
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The better-than-expected year-end GDP results was also 
reflected in the improving position of the economic cycle. 
Use major production factors gradually intensified in the 
course of the past year, but still falls short of the historically 
typical value. Substantial unutilised capacities may still be 
present in the economy (Chart 3-38). 
The macroeconomic time series and confidence indices 
moving together with the business cycle suggest that 
current output gradually approximated towards the 
potential level by the end of 2011, although the output gap 
may reopen in early 2012 with a renewed deterioration of a 
demand environment. According to our estimates, the 
output gap may be near 2-2.5 per cent in the second half of 
2012 (chart 3-39).
The development of several macroeconomic time series 
also confirms our view of the economy’s cyclical position. 
Inflation excluding indirect tax changes remains at a 
historically low level, although it gained pace in recent 
months. The current account balance continues to show a 
substantial surplus as a result of limited domestic demand. 
The unemployment rate has exceeded its estimated 
equilibrium level for an extended period while overtime in 
the manufacturing industry − effectively moving with the 
economic cycles − decreased in recent months (chart 3-40).
3.5  Cyclical position of the economy
At the turn of the year 2009−2010 the cyclical position of the economy moved past its low. Until the end of 2011, the 
cyclical position was characterised by slow, but gradual improvement, predominantly driven by improving external 
demand. The cyclical position of domestic moderately demand improved at the end of 2011, contributing to a rise in 
domestic core inflation as well. According to our current estimates, the output gap was negative in the past quarters as 
well. Output fell short of its potential level by 2-2.5 per cent. 
We expect a renewed, moderate decline in the cyclical position, due to the temporary deterioration in the external 
environment and the expected contractionary effect of government measures on demand. The renewed weakening of the 
cyclical position may limit the pass-through of rising producer costs into consumer prices with greater pressure in the 
coming quarters.
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Generally speaking the expenditure side items of GDP may 
currently fall short of their equilibrium level. The 
deterioration of the cyclical position of exports is due to 
the renewed downturn in external demand at the end of 
the year. Consumption demand also remains below the 
medium-term equilibrium level as a result of higher-than-
equilibrium unemployment, low real wage increases and 
tight household credit conditions. The uncertain demand 
environment and weak bank lending activity also keep 
corporate and household investments at a low level.
Chart 3-39
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3.6.1  WaGeS
Wage growth significantly accelerated in the national 
economy in the last month of last year. The substantial 
rise in wages is attributable to the timing of year-end 
bonus payments in December. Since companies timed their 
payments at the end of 2010 for January due to the pit 
decrease at the beginning of the year, this also produced 
a strong base effect. The payment of bonuses at the end 
of the year was characteristic in both the private and 
public sectors. The payment of bonuses in December is a 
return to the practice applied before 2010. the ratio of 
paid bonuses to regular wages continues to show a 
declining trend in comparison to pre-crisis years, and thus 
irregular wage elements remain one of the key channels of 
labour market adjustment. 
Regular wages in the private sector rose by an average of 
5 per cent throughout the year. The duality characterising 
wage trends in 2010 declined substantially in the past year 
and wage increases in the service sectors approximated 
those effected by manufacturing industry companies 
3.6  Costs and inflation
High wage growth was observed at the end of last year. The acceleration in the wage index is primarily attributable to 
year-end bonus payments which varied from payments made in 2010, while the 5 per cent increase in regular wages 
moderately exceeded the annual rate of inflation, but fell significantly short of the average rates measured before the 
crisis. Domestic inflation picked up significantly in recent months. The faster rise in the price index was mainly attributable 
to the government’s indirect tax increases, but in addition to rising consumption, the inflationary effect of the weaker 
exchange rate and persistently high commodity prices affected a growing portion of the consumer basket.
The wage increase observed at the end of 2011 is mainly attributable to the temporary effect resulting from the timing 
of bonus payments, which may be corrected at the beginning of this year. Administrative wage increases in the first 
quarter cause a substantial rise in regular wages. The announced compensation scheme may significantly offset the 
inflationary effect of rising labour costs over the short term. Wage increases in the manufacturing industry are in line with 
the gradual improvement productivity, which may continue to sustain low inflation characterising the products of the 
sector. However, in view of weak domestic sales opportunities, rising wages in the service sector may pose risks in terms 
of our inflation and/or employment forecast for this year. 
The general price-reducing effect of still weak domestic demand may persist throughout the year, and thus the pace of 
monthly price increases may gradually decline in the coming months. The trend may be supported by the normalised level 
of the EUR/HUF exchange rate which remained at stronger levels after January.
Chart 3-41
annual change of average monthly gross wages of 
employees 
(2005−2011)
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Per centPer cent
Total economy
Budgetary institutions
Business sector
Note: Change compared to the same month of the previous year (per 
cent).
Quarterly report on inflation • march 2012 49
MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
producing for export. The gradual wage increases observed 
in relation to market service sectors since early 2011 may 
suggest the mobility of workers in the manufacturing 
industry and service sectors and frictions arising in 
connection with certain sectors, despite the loose labour 
market (chart 3-42).
Wage increases also accelerated in the public sector at the 
end of the year, not including community service workers, 
this is presumably attributable to the payment of 
remuneration (e.g. wage supplements, on-call fees) that 
was not paid during the year. Wages of full-time workers 
employed in the community service programmes 
substantially increased. Due to the significant rise in the 
ratio of part-time employment, however, the average wage 
of programme participants is lower than in 2010. 
Wage dynamics expected over the short term are determined 
by the administrative wage increases effected at the 
beginning of the year in both the private and public sectors. 
We expect employers to implement the expected wage 
increases in relation to the employees concerned. A major 
portion of increased wage costs could be covered by the 
wage compensation scheme − supplemented with several 
tiers − as announced by the government. in the weak 
demand environment, however, companies may be forced 
to cut additional costs to maintain their profitability, 
possibly resulting in the limitation of bonuses and fringe 
benefits and lower wage increases provided to employees 
with higher wages. 
The first signs of this can be seen in the January data. In 
the private sector gross earnings without premiums rose 
by 9.6 per cent while gross earnings rose by 5.2 per cent. 
The acceleration of wage dynamics is mainly due to the 
remarkable administrative increase in lower-than-average 
wages while the bigger than average wages were 
characterised by historically low growth.
3.6.2  proDuCer prICeS
favourable agricultural harvests in 2011 contributed to the 
drop in producer prices in the second half of last year. The 
largest adjustment was observed in relation to seasonal 
products (vegetables, fruit). The rise in the price of cereals 
came to an end, but price levels did not decrease 
significantly. In relation to products of animal origin, in 
addition to rising dairy product prices, the previously high 
raw material prices also contributed to a significant 
increase in the price of meat. As an additional price-
boosting effect on products of animal origin, the price of 
eggs also increased significantly due to stricter animal 
keeping requirements. The weak exchange rate not only 
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contributed to an improvement of sales opportunities, but 
also to a rise in producer prices (Chart 3-44).
The depreciation of the HUF exchange rate early in the year 
and the renewed rise in oil prices caused another rapid rise 
of prices in the energy production sectors again. The effect 
of high commodity prices is passing through an ever broader 
segment of the industrial production chain, and thus an 
increase was also seen in the price index of sectors 
producing consumer goods at the beginning of the year 
(Chart 3-45). 
3.6.3  ConSuMer prICeS
the rise in domestic consumer prices slowed down in 2011, 
as the consumer price index came in at 3.9 per cent for the 
year as a whole. Domestic inflation was 4.1 per cent in the 
final quarter. in the begining of 2012, the consumer price 
index increased significantly, approaching 6 per cent, while 
core inflation neared 5 per cent from 3.3 per cent in 
December (Chart 3-46). The jump in inflation at the 
beginning of the year was mainly caused by the indirect tax 
increases in January, while high commodity prices and the 
substantial depreciation of the forint exchange rate in the 
previous quarters produced an inflationary effect in an 
increasingly wide segment of the consumer basket (Chart 
3-47). inflation in the first month of 2012 was higher than 
we expected in December.
Temporary effects may have also contributed to the 
unexpected rise in core inflation. The VAT increase paved 
way for coordinated price increases, where most costs 
accumulated earlier could be passed on to consumers. Price 
increases may have also been brought forward in this 
regard. According to our current estimates, the pass-
through of the VAT increase may be larger than we assumed 
earlier, but lower than observed in relation to VAT increases 
before the crisis.
Despite the weak demand, prices of industrial goods rose 
substantially. Prices of non-durable goods soared, and the 
rise might have been partially caused by increasing fuel and 
raw material prices and by the weak exchange rate. As a 
consequence of the January VAT-hike, coordinated price 
increases for non-durable goods may have had an effect on 
consumer prices in February as well. Although a part of the 
price increases is likely to be temporary, the significant 
acceleration of the inflation shows that firms may be able 
to pass through their costs into consumer prices even if 
domestic demand is subdued. Prices of durable goods 
decreased at the beginning of the year; the reduction of 
Chart 3-45
Industrial producer prices and consumer prices 
(annual change)
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
12.5
15
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Per centPer cent
Consumer goods producer branches
Consumer products from CPI (VAT filtered)
Energy producer branches (right-hand scale)
Intermediate goods producer branches (right-hand scale)
Note: Consumer prices refer only to products produced by the industry.
Chart 3-46
Consumer price index and core inflation 
(annual change)
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Per centPer cent
CPI
Core inflation
Chart 3-47
Decomposition of consumer price index
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Percentage point
Others
Food
Energy
Primary effects of government measures
CPI
Quarterly report on inflation • march 2012 51
MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
the car registration tax related to the large segment of 
motor vehicles also contributed to the decline. 
Inflation in the field of market services increased gradually 
at the end of 2011, but an even larger rise followed in 
January. The sharp rise in inflation is attributable to prices 
of service providers (telecommunications, insurance sector) 
which are subject to the payment of the special sectoral 
tax. It is also possible that companies brought forward the 
price increases commonly effected in the first months of 
the year to January of this year. As a one-off effect, the 
accident insurance tax introduced at the beginning of the 
year was settled in relation to market services, this alone 
increased the price index of the group by 0.6 percentage 
points.
Price of processed foods increased significantly at the 
beginning of the year. The weak exchange rate, high fuel 
prices and rising producer prices all contributed to price 
inflation for these products. In addition, the introduction of 
a health tax also affected the price index of the product 
group. The price of alcohol and tobacco products increased 
in excess of the VAT increase, presumably in reaction to the 
November excise tax increase. Intense competition on the 
market of tobacco products − characterising the previous 
year − is likely to have ended, and therefore we can expect 
a higher pass-through of taxes and costs this year.
Among non-core inflation items, apart from tax changes 
early in the year the price of unprocessed food increased at 
a lower rate than the seasonal average. Oil prices in USD 
rose in reaction to uncertainties related to the situation in 
Iran. The weakening of the euro also inflated oil prices 
denominated in euro and forints, which may result in high 
price levels for several quarters in relation to domestic fuel 
prices. The rapid depreciation of the EUR/HUF exchange 
rate also contributed to price increases in the first weeks of 
the year. Regulated energy prices increased in January 
2012, earlier than we expected in December. regulated 
price increases remain at a historically low level. 
3.6.4  InflatIonary expeCtatIonS
inflationary expectations rose again in 2011 h2, presumably 
attributable to high fuel prices, the announced tax measures 
and the gradually weakening exchange rate (Chart 3-49). 
The trend underwent a correction early this year, as 
expectations regarding additional significant price increases 
dropped significantly and inflationary expectations also 
weakened.
Inflationary expectations in the retail sector, which playing 
a key role in relation to consumer prices also declined 
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substantially in January and February. This confirms our 
assumption that the inflation data for January may also 
reflect temporary effects and the weak demand environment 
may continue to limit planned price increases (Chart 3-50).
With effect from 1 January 2012 the highest rate of Vat changed from 25 per cent to 27 per cent. calculated with unchanged net 
prices, the 2 per cent hike has raised the prices of the items concerned by 1.6 per cent. as the Vat increase affects approximately 78 
per cent of the consumer basket, the notional impact of the rise was 1.25 per cent at the level of the consumer price index. this means 
that, calculated with unchanged net prices, the VAT increase would have triggered such an equivalent in the price level.
Based on earlier domestic and international experience, changes 
in VAT are not incorporated in consumer prices immediately and 
fully. We used statistical methods to estimate the actual 
inflationary impact brought about by the VAT increase early this 
year. This impact reflects the difference between actually 
perceived changes in prices and the price changes that can be 
assumed without the VAT increase (hypothetical price changes). 
The inflation indicator net of this impact is relevant to monetary 
policy and offers information on changes in market prices, which 
move in conjunction with the supply and demand trends of the 
economy.
Based on the inflation data in January and February, we obtained 
the following results. The VAT hike in January raised the CPI by a 
total of 1.1 per cent, with the bulk of the increase materialising in 
January and a smaller portion in february (table 3-2). for 
methodological reasons, the CSO incorporated part of the rises in 
Box 3-2
Impact of the vat rate increase in January 2012 on inflation 
table 3-2
pass-through of the vat increase in January 2012 into the individual inflation groups 
(percentage impacts on the price level of individual groups)
Jan. 2012 feb. 2012 total pass-through
Food 0.7 0.1 0.8 76%
unprocessed 0.5 0.3 0.9 54%
processed 0.8 0.0 0.8 99%
Industrial goods 1.0 0.2 1.2 86%
durable 1.1 0.2 1.3 78%
nondurable 1.0 0.3 1.2 90%
Market services 0.7 0.0 0.7 78%
Market energy 1.4 0.1 1.5 92%
Alcohol, tobacco 1.4 0.0 1.4 90%
Fuel 1.6 0.0 1.6 100%
Administered prices 0.5 0.6 1.1 100%
CPI 0.9 0.2 1.1 87%
Core inflation 0.9 0.1 1.0 86%
Chart 3-51
Historical pass-through of vat increases into consumer 
prices
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
VAT pass-through, CPI VAT pass-through,
core inflation
Jan. 04
Sep. 06
July 09
Jan. 12
Quarterly report on inflation • march 2012 53
MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
regulated prices in the February data. Therefore, part of the VAT impact in February is attributable to this fact. On the other hand, 
we were able to identify the impact of the VAT increase in the February inflation data in the case of some market prices as well, such 
as unprocessed food, traded goods and market energy.
Based on the estimated VAT impact, relative to the technical impact, the pass-through into consumer prices amounted to 87 per cent 
at the level of the consumer basket as a whole, and 86 per cent in the case of core inflation. The magnitude of the pass-through 
exceeded the assumption underlying our inflation projection in December as presented in detail in Box 1-2 of the report on inflation 
published in September. the extent of the pass-through of core inflation has exceeded that of the last Vat increase in July 2009; 
however, it was smaller than the pre-crisis figures (Chart 3-51). Pass-through at the level of the CPI is similar to pre-crisis figures. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the latter case comparability is rendered difficult by the fact that the VAT rate increases in 
the individual periods affected regulated prices to a varying extent, for which we assume a 100 per cent pass-through as a rule. 
there may have been several reasons underlying a pass-through higher than the one in July 2009. one is that, compared with July, 
re-pricing is more frequent at the beginning of the year. This is likely to have facilitated the VAT increase in feeding through into 
consumer prices to a larger extent. Furthermore, it is likely that, due to the weaker profitability situation of the retail sector, the VAT 
increase could not be absorbed to a larger degree despite the permanently subdued demand.
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4.1.1  rISk perCeptIon of HunGary
The risk perception of Hungary deteriorated between 
December 2011 and mid-January 2012, owing to country-
specific factors; then, due to country-specific factors to a 
lesser extent, and to global impacts to a larger extent, it 
started to improve markedly at a steady pace.
This change for the worse in Hungary’s risk perception in 
late December and early January materialised, despite the 
fact that investor sentiment had improved thanks to 
concerted central bank measures at the global level, fading 
concerns about growth and measures in Europe aimed at 
managing the crisis. During these weeks, the risk perception 
of Hungary was completely out of synch with global and 
regional trends, which was primarily due to uncertainties 
related to the eu−imf negotiations.
Several factors are likely to have contributed to such a high 
concentration of unfavourable events early this year. Along 
with numerous investment institutions voicing concerns 
about the negotiations during the first days of the new year, 
it is also possible that some agents responded with some lag 
early this year to the unfavourable events around Christmas 
time (e.g. a warning from the IMF and an increasingly 
heated debate with the European Commission).
4  financial markets and interest rates
4.1  trends in the domestic financial market
Hungary’s risk perception has been improving substantially and at a steady pace since the sudden deterioration in 
December 2011. Nevertheless, indicators continue to reflect an overall unfavourable picture, in both a regional and a 
historical comparison, resulting in worsening risk perception in the relative sense. Domestic financial market indicators 
had deteriorated significantly by mid-January. This trend came to a halt after the government’s announcement of its 
commitment to reach an agreement with the EU and the IMF. In response to the favourable news on the approximation of 
standpoints, and underpinned by favourable regional and global trends, Hungary’s risk perception started to improve from 
mid-January. Nevertheless, it was country-specific factors which amplified the negative trends when risk premiums were 
soaring, whereas in the period of consolidation it was global factors that came into play, offsetting unfavourable country-
specific effects. Overall, in respect of the period as a whole, risk premiums and yields on government securities fell, the 
forint appreciated and government securities held by non-residents reached a historical high in March. Global trends and 
developments in the EU and IMF negotiations will probably continue to shape investors’ attitude towards Hungary to the 
largest extent.
Chart 4-1
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The ensuing improvement in risk perception can be 
attributed to a change in the government’s stance in 
relation to the EU-IMF talks and to favourable global trends. 
As a result of domestic events increasing the likelihood of 
an EU-IMF agreement (e.g. a more conciliatory tone on the 
acceptance of possible preconditions, and the announcement 
of the government’s intention to step up the pace of the 
talks as well as a meeting held by the prime minister and 
the central bank governor), the country’s risk perception 
began to improve from mid-January consistent with global 
trends. Overall, however, it was still unfavourable in 
regional comparison.
The 5-year CDS spread dropped from 576 basis points at the 
beginning of the period to 522 basis points at the end. the 
indicator was highly volatile over the entire period, ranging 
from 495 basis points to 735 basis points (chart 4-1, 4-2).
Notwithstanding the favourable trends, risk indicators 
continue to respond very hectically to news concerning the 
talks. In early March, the 5-year CDS premium rose by 30 
basis points in two days as some analysts expressed doubts 
about the government’s commitment to the talks.
The focus may shift to yields on FX bonds this year, due to 
the government’s need for a sizeable amount of FX 
financing. The 5-year domestic FX bond spread is currently 
at an extremely high level of over 700 basis points. Although 
the spread on EUR-denominated Hungarian FX bonds, 
compared to its counterpart in Germany, has followed a 
path similar to that of the CDS spread over the past months, 
there is still a significant difference between the levels of 
these two indicators. The previous close-to-zero gap 
widened to 190 basis points over a span of one month from 
the second half of November, and has stabilised at around 
200 basis points over the past 3 months (chart 4-3). 
The significant widening of the spread between these two 
indicators coincided with criticism from the credit rating 
agencies and the downgrades that followed. However, 
external factors may equally have contributed to this. An 
underlying internal reason is that, as a result of the 
country’s downgrade, EUR-denominated Hungarian bonds 
are no longer ECB-eligible coverage. In addition to this, the 
market is likely to have priced in a liquidity premium.
Underlying external reasons may have included the fact 
that, in response to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the 
market found CDSs on EUR-denominated bonds to be a less 
reliable instrument. Furthermore, it is likely that a higher 
exchange rate risk premium is priced in for EUR-denominated 
bonds. As there was a similar, albeit smaller, difference in 
respect of the bonds of the other countries in the region, it 
Chart 4-2
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Chart 4-3
premiums on 5-year fx bonds in the region
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is safe to assume that the latter causes are also likely to 
have contributed to high spreads on FX bonds (Chart 4-4).
Such a wide difference in yields on EUR and USD bonds also 
suggests segmentation in the markets.
In mid-February MNB announced new facilities conforming 
to international practice. Market participants welcomed the 
introduction of the new two-year lending facility, the 
broadening of the range of eligible collateral, and the new 
universal mortgage bond purchase scheme. Whereas 
subdued lending has been mainly driven by a decline in 
willingness to lend, in the recent period the decline in the 
banking sector’s capacity to lend has also been a relevant 
factor. thus − by alleviating the latter constraint − the 
facility is able to contribute to the strengthening of lending 
activity. The facility allows banks to access to funding at 
maturities of limited availability in the market without the 
need to pay a high term premium, which may result in 
improvement in the maturity match between assets and 
liabilities in banks’ balance sheets.
4.1.2  fx Market trenDS
Trends in Hungary’s risk perception were also reflected 
strongly in the eur/huf exchange rate. Between 20 
December and 5 January the exchange rate weakened from 
eur/huf 300 to eur/huf 320, which − taking into account 
trends in regional foreign exchange rates − can be 
interpreted as an occurrence specific almost entirely to 
Hungary. After the change in the government’s 
communication in January, the forint, like the Polish zloty, 
started to appreciate at a steady pace; nevertheless, news 
about and analyses related to the EU-IMF talks did have 
tangible impacts on the exchange rate on a number of 
occasions even after mid-January (Chart 4-5).
The sensitivity of the EUR/HUF exchange rate manifested 
itself most markedly in early March. Underlying reasons for 
this were that global risk sentiment deteriorated slightly 
because of concerns regarding the Greek debt swap deal, 
and that an increasingly large number of analysts voiced 
doubts about the possibility of a quick agreement between 
Hungary and the EU-IMF duo. In response, the HUF exchange 
rate depreciated from huf 288 to huf 298 over a span of 1 
week. With the ensuing adjustment taken into account, the 
EUR/HUF exchange rate appreciated from HUF 300 to HUF 
290 over the entire period, underperforming in a regional 
comparison.
Trends in option prices in the FX market confirm that the 
priced-in likelihood of forint depreciation has declined 
since early January. Risk reversal and the skewness indicator 
Chart 4-4
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Chart 4-5
Developments in foreign exchange rates in the region
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of the exchange rate have dropped to the low level last 
seen in the summer of 2011. the implied volatility of the 
exchange rate started to decline gradually, and in March it 
reached levels last seen in the autumn of 2011 (chart 4-6).
The appreciation of the forint has been supported by the 
fact that non-resident actors purchased a total of HUF 790 
billion in the spot market.
FX swap spreads reflected repeated episodes of tension 
(partly technical in nature) similar to those a year earlier 
and remained high at all maturities until end-January. By 
mid-March, with the exception of basis swaps with a 
maturity of over 1 year, spreads had returned to a level 
seen in earlier calmer periods, which can be attributed to 
improved FX liquidity conditions. Lower margin requirements 
in response to the appreciation of the forint, higher 
reliance on central bank facilities and the rolling over of 
some of the funds from maturing FX instruments in the 
swap market resulted in the easing of the FX liquidity 
tension in the banking system (Chart 4-8).
The net FX swap portfolio held by non-residents has 
decreased by approximately HUF 550 billion over the past 
period, which can be ascribed to two factors. One is that 
the portfolio of FX swaps linked to positions on which 
exchange rate gains can be realised if the forint weakens, 
i.e. those with a HUF purchase leg, has shrunk; the other is 
that due to the improved FX liquidity situation mentioned 
above, the portfolio of short-term FX swaps (lending in HUF/
raising FX funds) has expanded. 
4.1.3  tHe GovernMent SeCurItIeS 
Market anD yIelDS
Hungary’s improved risk perception was also reflected in 
the outcome of government securities auctions and 
secondary market yields (Chart 4-9). While quantities lower 
than announced were issued at a number of auctions in 
December, a higher-than-planned volume of government 
securities has been sold at declining average auction rates 
since mid-January. The Government Debt Management 
Centre (ÁKK) has raised funds in a gross total amount of 
huf 1,500 billion in the market since 20 December (chart 
4-10).
Secondary market yields followed a path similar to that of 
the EUR/HUF exchange rate and CDS spreads. There had 
been an approximately 150-basis point rise in the segment 
with a maturity of up to one year before the first week of 
January, then yields returned gradually to a level seen at 
the start of the period, representing a 7.1-per cent yield on 
3-month securities. there had been a 200-basis point rise 
Chart 4-6
1-month implied volatility and risk reversal
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in the segment with a maturity of over one year before 
early January, with major consolidation to follow. The 
5-year point of the yield curve dropped to somewhat below 
the starting value, i.e. 8.5 per cent.
The deterioration in Hungary ’s risk perception last autumn 
had a much smaller impact on non-residents’ portfolios of 
government securities. In fact, such portfolios have reached 
a historically high level over the past period. a huf 320 
billion increase came almost entirely from the purchase of 
government securities. 
Chart 4-9
Benchmark yields in the government securities market
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4.2.1  Corporate CreDIt terMS
HUF interest rates to corporate loans rose from 8.6 per cent 
to 9.4 per cent (Chart 4-11). By contrast, along with the 
1.5-percentage point rise in the HUF interbank interest rate 
(BUBOR), the smoothed interest spread declined standing at 
2.1 per cent at the end of January. interest rates on eur-
denominated loans declined from 4.4 per cent to 4 per cent 
at the end of 2011, and then rose again to reach 4.5 per 
cent. At the same time, in the period under review, the 
EUR-denominated interest rate (EURIBOR) fell, as a result of 
which the interest spread smoothed with a 3-month moving 
average rose from 2.5 per cent to 2.8 per cent (chart 4-12). 
Based on the lending survey, credit conditions were 
reported to have tightened again in the corporate segment, 
and a majority of banks expected further tightening over 
the six months as well (Chart 4-13). The main underlying 
reason for tightening has been declining willingness to lend, 
but in this lending survey the role of deteriorating lending 
capacity also increased considerably. The deterioration in 
funding is a very salient factor, which is attributable to 
shrinking external funding and rising foreign currency 
funding costs.
Current interest spreads reflect the interest rate conditions 
applied to corporate clientele which have tightened 
significantly since the onset of the crisis, due to banks’ non-
4.2  Credit conditions of the financial 
intermediaries
HUF interest spreads declined moderately, while EUR spreads increased somewhat in the corporate segment between 
October 2011 and January 2012. The former is attributable to the fact that the rise in the interbank interest rate (BUBOR) 
exceeded the rise in the interest rates on corporate loans, while the latter is due to rising foreign currency (FX) funding 
costs. In the Lending survey, credit conditions were reported to have tightened further in the corporate sector, and the 
deterioration in lending capacity, mainly banks’ deteriorating FX funding, is becoming a more pronounced factor in this 
regard. In the household segment, interest rates on mortgage loans has increased since the last Report on Inflation, which 
is due to refinancing of foreign currency denominated mortgage loans related to the early final repayment scheme. By 
contrast, special offer hire purchase loans temporarily reduced the interest rates on unsecured consumer loans. In the 
household segment, credit conditions were reported to have tightened markedly in the final quarter of 2011; further 
tightening was anticipated in the first half of 2012. Given the current credit conditions, a major part of the banking sector 
is focusing primarily on the premium segment. Yet, it is still unclear whether this attitude of the banks is a temporary 
impact of the early final repayment scheme or will persist over the longer term. Forward-looking real interest rates were 
shaped mainly by the increase in yields on government securities.
Chart 4-11
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Chart 4-12
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price supply constraints. Risk-based pricing allows clients 
with a prime credit rating to access credit on more 
favourable terms. This composition effect is further 
strengthened by the current tightening in non-price credit 
conditions, in response to which aggregate interest spreads 
may even decline. However, rising foreign currency funding 
costs represent upward pressure on spreads on EUR-
denominated loans. Parent bank CDS spreads and the 
Hungarian sovereign CDS spread, an important component 
in intra-group funding, have risen with 1.5-2 percentage 
points since July 2011 compared to 2011 Q2.
4.2.2  terMS of lenDInG to 
HouSeHolDS
Interest rates on housing and home equity loans have been 
shaped by the refinancing of foreign currency denominated 
mortgage loans related to the early repayment scheme over 
the past few months. Annual percentage rate of charge 
(aprc) on housing loans grew from 10.3 per cent to 12.5 per 
cent between october 2011 and January 2012 (chart 4-14), 
i.e. rising by more than 0.5 percentage point over the 
1.5-percentage point rise in the BUBOR. As a result, the 
interest spread was 5 percentage points over the 7.5 per 
cent BUBOR in January. Excluding Home Savings and Loan 
Associations, which have recently been representing a 
significant weight in new lending and offer products on 
favourable interest rates, the rise in the interest spread 
would be even more marked, approximating 6 percentage 
points (Chart 4-15). The APRC on home equity loans rose 
from 12.5 per cent in october 2011 to 13.5 per cent in 
January 2012, resulting in 6 per cent interest spread.
The APRC on unsecured consumer loans declined from 
around 30 per cent to 27 per cent at the end of 2011, and 
then returned to 30 per cent (chart 4-14) in January 2012. 
This temporary decline was caused by special offer hire 
purchases loans, with a higher weight within new unsecured 
lending.
Based on the lending survey, credit conditions for households 
were reported to have tightened materially in 2011 Q4 (chart 
4-16). In the case of mortgage loans, the stricter conditions 
are reflected in the lower loan-to-value and payment-to-
income ratios, and in a stricter required credit score. Banks 
expected further tightening of the payment-to-income ratio 
and required credit score over the next six months. As 
regards unsecured consumer loans, the required credit score 
and the payment-to-income ratio were reported to have 
tightened. Furthermore, in the case of vehicle financing, 
some tightening banks and leasing companies reported that 
they had ceased EUR-denominated financing, which 
accounted for 15–20 per cent of new financing in 2011.
Chart 4-13
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Chart 4-14
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FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INTEREST RATES
Given the current credit conditions, a major part of the 
banking sector is focusing primarily on the premium 
segment, i.e. on higher-income clientele with significant 
down-payment capacity and high-quality collateral. Hence, 
the high interest rates dampen demand for mortgage loans. 
As a result, the number of households that can afford 
housing investments may decrease significantly. Yet, it is 
still unclear whether this attitude of the banks is a 
temporary impact of the early final repayment scheme or 
will persist over longer term.
4.2.3  trenDS In real IntereSt 
rateS
the 1-year real interest rate rose from 2.6 per cent in 
november 2011 to 3.4 per cent in January, and then 
dropped to 2.8 per cent (chart 4-17). trends in real interest 
rates were mainly shaped by a sharp rise in and a 
subsequent adjustment of the yields on government 
securities, while 1-year forward-looking inflation 
expectations calculated on the basis of a Reuters poll stood 
at around 4.3 per cent. The real interest rate calculated 
from the deposit rates2 applied to deposits with a maturity 
of up to and 1 year reflected a similar trend before January, 
at a level lower by 1 percentage point though. We have no 
available data on February yet.
Chart 4-15
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Chart 4-17
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5.1.1  CHanGeS In tHe external 
poSItIon
The external financing capacity of the Hungarian economy 
increased to 3.7 per cent of GDp in 2011 Q3 (chart 5-1). the 
value of the external financing position continues to reflect 
the significant surplus in foreign trade, while the quarterly 
increase is attributable to the rise in the transfer balance 
surplus. The value of EU transfers, namely, exceeded 1 
billion euro in Q3. The balance improving effect of the 
transfer surplus was moderately impeded by the minor 
decline in the balance of goods and services in parallel with 
the slowdown in external economic activity and the 
moderate rise in the income balance deficit. 
Net exports remained above 7 per cent of GDP, although the 
value declined slightly compared to the previous quarter. 
The balance of goods and services shifted in opposite 
directions: while the surplus in the balance of services, 
which showed a marked increase in Q2, adjusted in Q3, the 
surplus in the balance of goods moderately increased. Both 
exports and imports of goods increased somewhat over the 
previous quarter, presumably attributable to the wind-up of 
the one-off effect − related to the earthquake in Japan − in 
Q2. on an annual basis, however, compared to the similar 
period of the previous year, this suggests a further 
slowdown in the dynamics, and data available for Q4 
5  the balance position of Hungarian 
economy
5.1  external balance and financing
The external financing capacity of the Hungarian economy increased further in 2011 Q3. The structure of the improving 
balance differed from trends observed in earlier periods. The improvement of the external position is principally attributed 
to the rise in the transfer balance surplus. At the same time, the surplus in net exports declined moderately in parallel 
with the slowdown in external economic activity, while the income balance deficit increased moderately as a result of 
rising interest expenditures. Developments on the financing side showed financial savings lower than indicated by the real 
economy. The level of the external financing capacity calculated on the basis of the financial account (“from below”) was 
lower than the value calculated from real economic developments (“from above”). The outflow of debt generating funds 
increased over the previous quarter, while the net inflow of non-debt generating funds was again at a higher rate following 
the outflows of previous quarters. The latter, however, only reflects the sale of pension funds’ foreign instruments; net 
FDI reflected an outflow in Q3 as well, due to the government purchase of the MOL capital share. The steady decline in 
foreign debt indicators, as observed since the middle of 2010, did not continue in Q3: with the roughly 10 per cent 
depreciation of the exchange rate, gross external debt increased, despite the net lending position, and GDP-proportionate 
net external debt also increased at a moderate rate.
Chart 5-1
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THE BALANCE POSITION OF HUNGARIAN ECONOMY
indicate a further slowdown in the growth of foreign trade 
and a continued decrease in the surplus. 
The slight increase in the income balance deficit is 
attributable to the continuing rise in net interest 
expenditures (chart 5-2). the deterioration of the interest 
balance since end-2010 is principally attributable to 
increasingly high government interest expenditures, which 
was observed in relation to both HUF and FX government 
bonds. This is mainly due to the rising stock of government 
bonds held by non-residents and gradual repricing in 
parallel with a risk premium that is higher than before the 
crisis. The interest balance of banks and companies 
remained stable in the first three quarters.
The relatively low transfer balance observed earlier in the 
year improved, reflecting the growing use of EU transfers. 
Combined with the use of the EU transfer in excess of net 
1 billion euro in Q3, a total of 2.4 billion euro eu funds were 
used by resident participants in the first three quarters of 
the year. 
5.1.2  DevelopMentS In fInanCInG
While the external balance surplus of the economy 
calculated from above increased further in Q3 according to 
the indicator based on real economic data, financing data 
show declining financing capacity (calculated from below) 
over the previous quarter. In terms of the structure of the 
external financing capacity calculated from below, the net 
debt type outflow increased in parallel with the rise in non-
debt generating funds (FDI and portfolio shares) (Chart 5-3).
The outflow of non-debt type liabilities observed in 
previous quarters was followed by substantial inflows in Q3. 
This reversal, however, is attributable only to the inflow of 
net portfolio shares, but in this case, this is related to the 
decrease in foreign assets and not to the inflow of new 
funds. The substantial inflow of funds, namely, is linked to 
the sale of foreign investment units and shares related to 
the sale of pension fund assets, while the decline in the 
portfolio shares of non-resident investors meant an outflow 
of funds (Chart 5-4).
On the whole, net foreign direct investment did not 
increase in Q3 either, but this is attributed to a one-off 
factor. The government purchase of the foreign MOL stake 
was carried out in July (approximately eur 2 billion), 
leading to the decrease in shares held by foreign investors, 
i.e. corresponding to a non-debt type outflow. The 
transaction, however, did not reduce the total (net) 
quantity of foreign funds in the economy, as the central 
bank foreign exchange reserve (as a foreign asset) declined 
Chart 5-2
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Chart 5-3
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by a similar amount. Apart from the MOL transaction, net 
foreign direct investment increased, attributable to 
(estimated) reinvested earnings in addition to the rise in 
foreign shares.3
The debt type outflow in the third quarter also exhibited a 
trend which covered the different external debt trends of 
the private sector and general government. In parallel with 
the net outflow of the debt generating funds of the private 
sector (primarily of banks) approximating eur 2.5 billion, 
net external funds of consolidated general government 
increased by roughly eur 2 billion (chart 5-5). the external 
financing trends of the government on the debt side were 
determined by the non-resident held, significantly rising 
stock of government securities and the decreasing FX 
reserve related to the purchase of the MOL stake. External 
funds in the banking sector declined further in Q4, partly as 
a result of the early repayment of FX loans and partly in 
connection with the capital withdrawals of European banks 
in the Central Eastern European region (for further details 
see Box 1.1), while the external debt of the general 
government increased further in relation to non-resident 
demand for government securities and MNB bonds.
External debt indicators, which had declined or stabilised in 
the past quarters, increased again in Q3: GDP-proportionate 
gross external debt rose to 115 per cent and net external 
debt increased to 52 per cent (chart 5-6). although a minor 
volume of (gross) debt type inflow was recorded in Q3, this 
only explains a fraction of the change in debt. The increase 
is attributed to the roughly 10 per cent weakening of the 
forint exchange rate, which resulted in marked revaluation. 
The rise in the net external debt rate was not as high. 
There has been an outflow of funds on a net basis, where 
debt generating assets (principally the foreign exchange 
reserve) were also revaluated. And this had a decreasing 
effect on net external debt.
Chart 5-5
Debt generating financing 
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EUR billionEUR billion
Consolidated government
Banking sector
Corporate sector
Debt generating financing
Chart 5-6
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Growth in net lending may accelerate in 2012. the indicator, 
which is calculated from above reflecting real economy 
processes and is generated from the combined balance of 
the current account and the capital account, is likely to rise 
from a GDP-proportionate value of close to 4 per cent in 
2011 to 6 per cent in 2012, and close to 7 per cent in 2013 
(Chart 5-7). This also means that net lending calculated 
from below − reflecting trends on the financing side − may 
strengthen significantly in the years to come; it will, 
however, lag behind net savings from above.
The improved net lending position is mainly due to expected 
trends in foreign trade. Deteriorating domestic and external 
economic activity will restrain foreign trade, but net 
exports are likely to outpace imports in the coming years as 
well. the expected improvement in the terms of trade − 
mainly due to decrease in oil prices based on futures prices 
− may also contribute to the increasing surplus in goods and 
services balance. Furthermore, the automobile industry 
boosts exports and global economic activity is expected to 
pick up from end-2012; these factors are likely to contribute 
to a sizeable surplus on the balance of goods and services.
Assuming that EU transfers at the end of the year was as 
strong as experienced in Q3, the use of eu transfers in 2011 
may reach the amount of the previous year. According to 
our forecast, an increasingly large amount of EU financing 
is likely to be used, due in part to a decrease in own funds 
required for investments. As a result, the balance of 
transfers may exceed 3 per cent of GDP this year and 4 per 
cent in 2013, contributing to a stronger net lending position.
5.2  forecast for the external balance
The net lending position of the Hungarian economy may continue to strengthen until 2013, supported mainly by the impact 
of the start of automobile manufacturing which will improve net exports and external economic activity which is 
anticipated to pick up from end-2012. Increasing use of EU transfers may also contribute to an improved net lending 
position. Due to weak external demand, the deficit n the income balance is expected to stabilise this year, while the rising 
profits of foreign corporations may result in an increasing deficit in the income balance. The expected significant net 
lending position in the coming years may accompanied by further decrease in banks’ foreign liabilities, causing low lending 
capacity of the banking sector and thus weak domestic demand. The underlying reason for a significant improvement in 
the net lending position in 2012 is an anticipated decline in the general government’s financing requirement, while 
households’ financial savings may shrink in the years ahead, as one-off impacts encouraging savings (e.g. disbursement of 
real return and early final repayment) come to an end.
Chart 5-7
Developments in the net lending position 
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The beneficial impact of net exports and transfers on net 
lending is partly mitigated by an increase in the deficit on 
the income balance. One likely major contributor to this is 
a rise in interest income transferred abroad, triggered by 
repricing of debt and the weaker HUF exchange rate. In 
addition, this may be enhanced by the rising profit outflow 
of foreign-owned companies from 2013. a halt in economic 
growth may slow down the rise in profits transferred to 
foreign owners this year, partly counterbalancing the 
increase in the interest income balance. Next year, however, 
the anticipated pick-up in economic activity, discontinuation 
of the sectoral separate tax payment liability and the 
halving of the bank tax may lead to higher profits for 
foreign corporations and, hence, a higher deficit on the 
income account.
trends in savings in the domestic sectors in 2011 were 
determined by the further balance sheet adjustment and 
the general government easing, accounting for approximately 
2.7 per cent of GDp (chart 5-8). a significant part of this 
translated into a rise in the financial savings of the private 
sector. VAT was refunded to corporations pursuant to the 
ruling of the European Court. The disbursement of pension 
fund real returns and the transformation of the tax regime 
benefiting mainly higher income groups with a higher saving 
rate resulted in higher savings in the household sector.
The main underlying reason for a stronger net lending 
position in 2012 is the projected decline in the general 
government’s net borrowing. This year, a fiscal impulse 
similar in size to last year’s easing, but in the opposite 
direction will be exerted on the private sector. Part of this 
is the discontinuation of the one-off impacts in 2011 (e.g. 
disbursement of pension fund real returns and VAT refunds), 
which will reduce both household and corporate savings. 
Further government measures, the other component of the 
fiscal impulse (discontinuation of income tax credits, 
tightening of disability support benefits and reductions in 
some items of social expenditure, etc.), will hit mainly 
lower income groups hard, and thus it is only likely to exert 
a moderate impact on household savings. Meanwhile, the 
decreasing lending willingness due to higher risk and 
weakening lending ability caused by the withdrawal of 
funds by foreign banks point to a slower-than-projected 
pick-up in lending to the private sector. 
Under our forecast, financial savings capturing underlying 
processes in the household sector will not change 
significantly in the years to come. The discontinuation of 
one-off items boosting savings (e.g. real returns and early 
final repayment) projects decline in the SNA-deficit 
consistent net lending in the years to come (Table 5-1). 
Chart 5-8
Developments in the net lending position of the individual 
sectors 
(as a proportion of GDP)
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The net lending of the corporate sector is expected to 
continue to contribute to the net lending of the economy 
considerably. Main contributors to growth in financial 
savings are a faster flow of EU transfers and improved 
profitability ensuing economic activity anticipated to 
recover from 2013 onwards. 
In the forecast horizon, the persistently high external 
balance may result in a considerable reduction of the 
external debt and liability indicators. Calculating with 
relatively stable HUF exchange rate, net external liabilities 
in proportion to GDp may decline by 20 percentage points 
by the end of 2013 (chart 5-9).
Chart 5-9
net external debt and liability indicators 
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table 5-1
anticipated trends in the various indicators of household savings
(as percentage of GDP)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
I. net financial saving consistent with augmented Sna deficit 2.1 3.6 5.9 5.1 4.2
a) Impact of the early repayment on net savings 0.6 0.6
b) Savings attributed to the disbursement of real yields 0.6
II. net lending capturing basic trends (I.−a−b) 2.1 3.6 4.7 4.5 4.2
c) Accrual basis accounting of the second pillar 1.7 1.3
d) Impact of the early repayment on net savings 0.6 0.6
e) Wealth effect due to leaving the second pillar −0.1 −0.2 −9.5
f) Consumption attributed to the disbursement of real yields −0.3
III. net financial saving in the financial accounts (II.+c+d+e) 3.7 4.6 −4.5 5.1 4.2
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5.3.1  BuDGetary SItuatIon anD 
outlook
Based on preliminary data, the 2011 eSa balance may, in line 
with our earlier forecast, close with a surplus of 4.2 per cent 
as a proportion of GDP, which is attributable to a 9.5 asset 
transfer due to exists from private pension schemes. in 2012, 
we expect a 4 per cent deficit, without the cancellation of 
unallocated fiscal reserves, as a result of the combined 
impact of deteriorating macro-economic conditions and the 
measures aimed at improving the fiscal balance. Under our 
rule-based projection, deficit may grow to 4.3 percentage 
points in 2013, because further reduction in expenditures 
will not be able to offset the revenue loss due, in part, to tax 
cuts, and the increasing net interest expenses (table 5-2).4
It follows from our ESA deficit projection that we do not 
consider a deficit target of below 3 per cent attainable in 
the 2012−2013 period even if disposable unallocated fiscal 
5.3  fiscal developments
Our views on fiscal policy have not changed significantly since the forecast in December 2011. The augmented SNA balance, 
which reflects fiscal trends comprehensively and assesses the effect of fiscal demand, remained nearly unchanged over the 
forecast horizon. By contrast, the ESA deficit rose slightly, by somewhat more than 0.3 percentage point as a proportion 
of GDP. This shift has mainly methodological and accounting-related causes and is interconnected with items that we 
already incorporated into the SNA-type indicator on earlier occasions. 
According to our forecast, the 2011 demand-side stimulus of approximately 2.7 per cent of GD is likely to be followed by 
a fiscal demand contraction of at least 2.2 percentage points in 2012. This negative fiscal impulse may, through the 
cancellation of all unallocated fiscal reserves, reach 3.1 percentage points. The fiscal demand effect is likely to be neutral 
in 2013. Nevertheless, meeting the government’s deficit targets and the criteria of the Excessive Deficit Procedure will 
require further adjustments.
In 2012, a negative fiscal impulse exerting its impact through aggregate demand will curb household consumption and thus 
cushion the feed-through of higher production costs into consumer prices. On the other hand, on the supply side, certain 
components of fiscal tightening − VAT and excise tax increases − will raise the 2012 consumer price index directly and 
materially. As regards regulated energy prices, we continue to expect a price increase this year that falls behind the rise 
in raw material prices and is close to average inflation.
4  in our projection for 2013 we assumed that special sectoral taxes would be discontinued, the special tax on financial institutions would be halved, 
personal income tax base would no longer include employer contributions (‘half super gross’), simplified corporate tax would be phased out, employers 
would be eligible for new tax breaks on their low-skilled employees and there would be fewer tax breaks related to social security contributions due 
to wage compensation. Excluding the impact of tax refunds related to the agreement with the Banking Association, as a result of lower taxes and 
other fiscal trends, tax and contribution revenues may decrease by close to 1.4 per cent of GDp in 2013.
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reserves are cancelled in full. although the 2012 deficit can 
be reduced to 2.9 percentage points by cancelling the huf 
52 billion chapter specific balancing reserves, it will still be 
above the original 2.5 per cent deficit target of the 
government. Therefore, based on our projected deficit 
trajectory, meeting the government’s deficit target and 
exit from the Excess Deficit Procedure will require further 
steps improving the fiscal balance. Although the government 
announced its intention of initiating further measures, the 
absence of quantifiable details, we did not incorporate 
further adjustment to the baseline scenario.
The deterioration in the ESA balance relative to our 
December forecast stems from individual items related 
mainly to methodological corrections; they raise the deficit 
by approximately 0.3 percent of GDP over the forecast 
horizon (Table 5-3). Within this, the direct fiscal impact of 
the agreement concluded with the Banking Association will 
be 0.1 to 0.05 percentage point higher relative to our earlier 
assumption. This is due, mainly, to the fact that the 
table 5-2
General government balance indicators 
(as a percentage of GDP)
 2011 2012 2013
ESA balance 4.2 −4.0 −4.3
ESA balance with cancelling free central reserves* − −3.1 −3.4
ESA balance with cancelling frozen appropriations in chapters** − −2.9 −
Augmented SNA balance*** −6.1 −4.2 −4.3
Cyclical component −0.6 −0.7 −0.5
Cyclically-adjusted augmented SNA balance*** −5.5 −3.5 −3.9
* Based on the assumption of the cancellation of the Country Protection Fund and Interest Risk Reserve in full. The government has unallocated central 
reserves in a total amount of HUF 268 billion which, if the need arises, can be spent on the improvement of the fiscal balance. In respect of 2013, in 
the absence of the relevant Bill, we relied on a technical assumption under which the amount of unallocated central reserves is identical with the 
previous year’s.
** Based on the assumption of the full cancellation of chapter specific reserves. Our baseline scenario did not consider the positive impact which the 
cancellation of the reserves may have on the fiscal balance. The cancellation of frozen allocations will also affect macro-economic developments.
*** Excluding the cancellation of unallocated central budget reserves.
table 5-3
Components of the shift in the eSa balance relative to our December 2011 projection 
(as a proportion of GDP)
2012 2013
1. Individual items total −0.30 −0.29
   1.1 Effect of the agreement with the Banking Association −0.12 −0.05
   1.2 public transport companies (mÁV, BKV) −0.19 −0.18
   1.3 Road maintenance 0.00 −0.07
2. Change in the primary balance (without specic items) −0.08 −0.03
   2.1 change in central primary revenues −0.10 −0.21
   2.2 change in central primary expenditures −0.03 0.08
   2.3 additional fiscal adjustment by local governments 0.05 0.10
3. net interest payments 0.05 −0.05
total change of eSa balance (1+2+3)* −0.33 −0.37
* Adjusted for the denominator impact related to changes in the nominal GDP.
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expected real asset purchases of the National Asset 
manager − which is part of the government sector − will 
have to be accounted for as expenditures. The incorporation 
of the operating loss of the MÁV (Hungarian Rail) and BKV 
will deteriorate the deficit by close to 0.2 percentage 
point.5 Furthermore, we have also incorporated the 
continuing revenue losses that will continue still be incurred 
in public road management in 2013, similarly to the 
treatment of such losses in 2012.
Overall, base-year effects, macro-economic trends and 
corrections to our estimates have only led to minor changes 
compared to our projections in December. Tax and 
contribution revenues may be 0.1 and 0.2 percentage point 
lower this year and in 2013, respectively. revenue losses 
will be offset, in 2013, by additional adjustments in 
municipal finance and further reductions of primary 
expenditures of the central budget. Compared to our 
projections in December, interest payments are expected 
to be lower in 2012 and higher in 2013.
contrary to deterioration of the fiscal balance − mostly 
attributable to accounting issues − the possible return to 
the public pension scheme of the remaining private pension 
scheme members and the ensuing transfer of assets pose an 
upside risk to the central budget in 2012. if all current fund 
members decide to return, the balance is likely to improve 
by 0.7 per cent of GDP. This is, however, only a one-off 
effect rather than a structural one.
The unfavourable shift in the ESA deficit due to one-off 
items is not reflected in the augmented SNA balance, which 
better captures fiscal trends from a macro-economic 
perspective. (table 5-2) this indicator used by the mnB 
recognises budgetary revenues and outlays on the basis of 
their actual economic impact and incorporates quasi-fiscal 
activities such as the operating losses of the MÁV and the 
BKV as well as transactions of the National Asset Manager. 
As the assets transferred from private pension fund do not 
qualify as revenues under this approach while the 
disbursement of real returns to pension scheme members is 
accounted for as qualifies as an expenditure, we expect the 
Sna deficit to reach 6.1 per cent of GDp in 2011. With fiscal 
reserves included, the deficit may drop to 4.2 percentage 
points this year and increase slightly in 2013. as a result of 
the changes in accounting for the ESA deficit, the gap 
between the MNB’s analytical indicator the official ESA 
balance will narrow considerably in 2012 and 2013.
5  We relied on the 2011 eDp report and the methodology applicable to the financial accounts in the case of the mÁV. under the methodology, that part 
of the borrowing needs of the company that materialises due to the performance of its public service contract is recognised as government 
expenditure. BKV’s operating losses can no longer be recorded outside the government’s books because the company has practically lost its 
creditworthiness and can only renew (extend) its maturing loans with government guarantees. We have incorporated BKV’s financing needs into the 
balance of the local governments, which is already partially reflected in the metropolitan council’s 2012 budget.
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While there has been no material change in the SNA 
balance, the cyclically adjusted augmented balance has 
deteriorated tangibly. The underlying reason for this is that 
the level of potential GDP is lower than estimated earlier. 
Thus, tax revenues picking up after the closing of the 
output gap will improve the fiscal position to a lesser extent 
than assumed earlier. Based on the assumption that the 
unallocated reserves of the budget will be cancelled in full, 
the cyclically adjusted medium-term balance will record a 
deficit of close to 3percentage point by the end of our 
forecast horizon. To conclude, although a deficit target of 
less than 3 per cent may be met even if no measures are 
taken, that still exceeds the 1.5-percent threshold value of 
the medium term objective (MTO) prescribed by the 
European Commission. 
5.3.2  IMpaCt of fISCal DeManD
Fiscal impulses, i.e. demand generated by the budget, 
reflect the way in which fiscal measures, trends and 
automatic stabilizers affect the income position of other 
sectors. In order to quantify fiscal impulses, we use changes 
in the primary SNA balance. 
On the basis of this impulse indicator, after the significant 
fiscal easing − accounting for 2.7 per cent of GDp − in 2011, 
a contraction of a similar magnitude may materialise this 
year. in 2013, fiscal impact on demand will be practically 
neutral (Table 5-4, Chart 5-10)6. One-off items account for 
1.5 percentage points of the baseline GDP-proportionate 
fiscal tightening which, in 2012, is 2.2 per cent or 3.1 per 
6  We present trends in fiscal impulses in a structure that corresponds to that of the national accounts compiled by the National Statistical Office. 
Nevertheless, our figures may be different from the data published by the CSO due to the adjustments to the augmented SNA balance.
table 5-4
Changes in fiscal impulses in the context of CSo’s accounting structure 
(as a percentage of GDP)
2011 2012 2013
I. fiscal impulse total (1+2+3) 2.7 −2.2 −0.1
1. Impulse towards households 1.7 −1.2 −1.1
   1.1 Transfer of private pension yields 0.8 −0.8 0.0
   1.2 other measures and impulse effects 1.0 −0.4 −1.1
2. net indirect taxes* 0.2 −0.7 1.2
3. other (corporate and external sectors, government purchases) 0.7 −0.3 −0.2
   3.1 VAT refund to companies 0.7 −0.7 0.0
   3.2 free central reserves 0.0 0.9 0.0
   3.3 Other unallocable items 0.0 −0.5 −0.2
II. one-off effects total (1.1+3.1) 1.5 −1.5 0.0
III. Impulse with cancelling free reserves (I.-3.1) 2.7 −3.1 0.0
* Net indirect taxes comprise factors that shape the GDP deflator through the difference between market prices and basic prices, and can significantly 
affect inflation in economic sense as well. The revenue loss stemming from the elimination of specific sectoral taxes in 2013 is accounted for within 
this category.
Chart 5-10
Historical trends in fiscal impulses and the primary Sna 
balance 
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cent depending on whether unallocated reserves are 
cancelled. therefore, measures related to the 2012 budget 
have an actual role to play in the remaining 0.7 to 
1.6-percentage point contraction. Within the one-off items, 
the absence of the payout of real returns to private pension 
scheme members account for 0.8 of GDP. A further 
0.7-percentage point impulse impact stems from the fact 
that VAT refunds that had to be paid to corporations last 
year under the applicable ruling of the European Court of 
Justice will no longer have to be paid this year. 
After the disbursement of real returns to private pension 
scheme members and the adoption of lower personal 
income tax rates, both of which increased household 
income, fiscal policy will impose severe tightening on 
households in 2012 and 2013. a major component of the 
tightening is the reduction in cash transfers (pensions, 
social benefits) and public sector wages. Within 2 years, 
cumulatively, the former will result in a 0.9 percentage 
point, the latter in a 0.3 percentage point contraction in 
demand. The impact of curbing household income growth 
will, however, be cushioned by a mandatory wage increase 
and related tax breaks making up for the phase-out of tax 
credits and a capital transfer under the agreement with the 
Banking Association (early final repayment on favourable 
terms). 
5.3.3  DevelopMentS In 
GovernMent DeBt 
Based on the preliminary financial accounts, GDP-
proportionate debt decreased by approximately 
1 percentage point in 2011 relative to 2010. although debt 
decreased by 5 percentage points due to the cancellation of 
government securities taken over from private pension 
funds, the year-end depreciation of the forint led to an 
increase of a similar size through the revaluation of 
FX-denominated debt.
Our projection for debt assumes the cancellation of 
unallocated reserves of the budget and, in line with the 
debt rules laid down in the Act on Financial Stability, a 
technical assumption of a constant exchange rate). Based 
on this, debt may decrease gradually, but at a moderate 
pace in the next 2 years. Debt may decrease to a larger 
extent if the government uses up the financial assets (e.g. 
FX deposits, the remaining portion of the private pension 
fund portfolio) at its disposal gradually and, in parallel with 
the release of safety reserves, spend them on reducing 
debt (Chart 5-11).
Chart 5-11
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In keeping with earlier years’ practice, we will provide an 
overview of our forecasting performance in respect of the 
previous year. The objective of our analysis is to map the 
shocks that influence forecast errors the most and, by 
identifying them, obtain information on the underlying 
operation of our forecasting system. Our analysis is of two 
types: one is an absolute analysis focusing on the errors of 
central bank analyses and the other is a relative analysis 
comparing the forecasting performance of the central bank 
with market analyst forecasts.
We first provided a forecast of the 2011 inflation in may 
2009. our projections made at the trough of the global 
economic crisis were for below-the-target inflation and 
historically low core inflation. The underlying reason was 
that − in addition to the low commodity prices − we 
forecasted a protracted, slow economic recovery. 
Furthermore, our assumption for persistently tight monetary 
policy also pointed in this direction. from early 2010, it 
became increasingly clear that − along with another 
increase in commodity prices − the economic climate may 
improve more than we expected. Accordingly, we revised 
our forecasts consistently upward and from mid-2010 
onwards we expected the inflation target to be missed in 
2011. from end-2010, our forecasts for the 2011 inflation 
stabilised, typically projecting historically low levels of 
inflation. Our projections were in accordance with the 
incoming actual data.
in november 2010, we forecasted a significant acceleration 
in core inflation. The main underlying reason was that we 
expected the impact of sectoral taxes on consumer prices. 
We had been expecting a significant pass-through, which 
was not, however, underpinned by January data; accordingly, 
we revised down our forecast in early 2011.
Chart 6-1
Inflation and core inflation forecasts
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6  Special topics
6.1  evaluation of the central bank’s forecasts 
for 2011
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Our forecast errors were notably influenced by errors in our 
assumptions for exogenous variables.7 after may 2009, the 
exchange rate of the forint appreciated markedly vis-à-vis 
the euro and remained fundamentally stable until 2011 Q4; 
therefore, it only affected our forecast errors to a smaller 
extent. In the period discussed, a rise in fuel prices and 
agricultural producer prices was dominant in respect of 
inflation. In both cases, due to a trend-like rise in global 
prices, we had to revise our projections significantly higher 
on an on-going basis up to mid-2011.
By contrast, regulated prices fared better than expected. In 
line with the government measures, changes in price 
formulae have markedly cushioned the inflationary impact 
of rising commodity costs over the past few years. Weaker-
than-expected domestic demand also suggested lower 
inflation. This was offset to some extent by the fact that we 
also revised down our view on potential GDP. Subdued 
demand was only partially able to offset the increased costs 
triggering higher inflation.
After adjustment for the errors in the exogenous variables, 
the errors made were close to zero, though we identified 
severe negative modelling errors in our projections in 2010. 
As the average modelling error was low, nothing suggested 
any structural shortcomings in our forecasting systems.
We made significant errors in our assessment of cost shocks 
and households’ consumer demand. We anticipated a 
tangible rise in consumption before mid-2011 as a response 
to improved outlook for economic activity and significant 
income growth affecting households in 2011 (lower personal 
income tax rates and disbursement of real yields on private 
pension fund investments). Contrary to our expectations, 
despite the sizeable additional incomes, consumption 
remained broadly flat in 2011, restraining the feed-through 
of rising commodity prices into consumer prices. Weaker 
consumption was attributable to the lower-than-expected 
lending activity of the banking system, households’ balance 
sheet adjustments, which took considerably longer than 
expected, and the strong appreciation of the CHF exchange 
rate.
overall, most of our errors pertaining to 2011 were 
attributable to unforeseeable cost shocks, which were in 
part offset by the low administered price inflation and 
weaker-than-expected domestic economic activity. Our 
Chart 6-2
Changes in our projections for the eur/Huf exchange rate, 
oil prices calculated in eur and agricultural producer prices
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7  We undertook a major change to our projection methodology in the period reviewed (i.e. may 2009 and December 2011). Before november 2010, our 
projections considered monetary policy as an exogenous factor, and were, therefore, based on an assumption of an unchanged EUR/HUF rate and an 
unchanged central bank base rate. By contrast, from march 2011 onwards, our projections began to consider monetary policy as an endogenous factor, 
i.e. we assumed that monetary policy responds to changes in the economic environment on an ongoing basis. the projections reviewed for 2011 mainly 
concern the short-term forecasts under the new model. Over this time horizon, endogenous monetary policy is only likely to exert a minor impact, 
and thus we do not think that our comparisons are distorted with regard to our forecasting performance in 2011.
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errors in respect of forecasts covering periods longer than 
one year were relatively serious, which can be mostly 
attributed to our technical assumptions. Over shorter 
horizons, our forecasts responded swiftly to changes in the 
macroeconomic environment, as a result of which only 
small forecast errors were made from end-2010 onwards.
In addition to conducting an absolute analysis, we also 
compared our projections with market forecasts. It should 
be noted that the information basis used for forecasts differ 
materially in several aspects in the case of market and 
central bank forecasts. Central bank projections are 
so-called conditional forecasts. Unlike market analyst 
forecasts, which are unconditional, our forecasts contain a 
number of pre-determined conditions (trends in fiscal 
policy, global oil prices and, up to november 2010, 
monetary policy variables). This difference is likely to give 
rise to material deviations especially in the case of 
projections for longer horizons.
Comparing the forecasts of the analysts participating in 
MNB and Reuters polls, we can establish that the median of 
analyst expectations was closer to actual inflation over 
longer horizons. Since may 2010, central bank forecasts 
have become more accurate and had fewer errors in them 
until end-2011 than market projections. in the first half of 
this period market analyses were more optimistic than 
MNB’s, and then started to point to higher inflation from 
mid-2011.
Chart 6-3
average inflation forecast error for 2010 and its 
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Note: Errors show deviations of the forecast from the actual data.
Chart 6-4
Household consumption forecasts for 2011
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Chart 6-5
effect of the most important factors on our forecast
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Chart 6-6
forecasts of the analysts participating in the reuters 
survey and the 2011 average annual inflation forecast of 
the MnB
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Recently published statistics offer a rather conflicting view 
of employment trends in Hungary. Labour Force Survey 
(lfS) data reveal that employment grew steadily in 2011, 
and there was some halt only in January 2012. By contrast, 
institutional statistics suggest that there was already some 
moderation in staffing levels in 2011, and in January 2012 
the number employed dropped to levels last seen during 
the trough of the crisis. The objective of this analysis is to 
evaluate recent employment data pertaining to the past 
few months in a more subtle manner.
Differences and discrepancies between statistics have been 
existing in the previous years. LFS data tends to follow 
changes in institutional statistics with a lag, and institutional 
statistics also reflects production trends better. Differences 
between the two types of statistics arise from differences 
in data collection: the Labour Force Survey contains 
businesses employing less than 5 persons, self-employed 
persons and those employed in the shadow (‘grey’) economy. 
The two data sources offer rather conflicting view of the 
2011 trends. according to lfS, there was a constant 
expansion in employment, especially in market services. 
Manufacturing have been also expanding for the first three 
quarters, but there was contraction in the final quarter. 
Trends in economic activity hardly explain the differences 
in staffing levels between the individual sectors: the 
performance of market services sector was rather subdued 
in response to weak domestic demand, while relatively 
favourable external demand boosted export-oriented 
manufacturing. 
By contrast, institutional statistics shows a slight moderation 
of employment in 2011. in line with more favourable 
economic prospects in early 2011, employment in 
manufacturing was still expanding. Then in the second half 
of the year, concurrently with deterioration in growth 
prospects, the number employed also dropped. Concurrently, 
staffing levels remained unchanged in the market services 
sector, and there were lay-offs in sectors affected by crisis 
taxes.
6.2  evaluating the recent developments  
in total employment 
Chart 6-7
number of employed in the national economy according to 
various statistics
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labour supply has been increasing consistently since 2008 in 
response to the government measures of earlier years, and 
that enlarged supply might have been absorbed by small 
businesses or, with less likelihood, the shadow economy. 
According to the LFS-data, the new self-employed and 
micro-enterprises are mainly set up in sectors as 
accommodation, wholesale and retail trade and agriculture, 
which closed a good year in 2011. as domestic demand 
closely linked to these sectors is expected to remain 
subdued, some adjustments to higher staffing levels are 
anticipated in these sectors. 
Institutional statistics reflected significant drop in total 
employment in January 2012. reduction is due, in part, to 
community work schemes. As these schemes are renewed 
early each year, it is now safe to say that public sector 
employment tends to drop in January and February and 
reaches a peak in the second half of the year as subsidised 
vacancies are filled. This phenomenon can be identified in 
both the LFS and institutional statistics data. Data from 
Labour Centres confirm that the decline is likely to be 
temporary: the number of registered unemployed hiked in 
January; in February, however, as the number of subsidised 
jobs grew, the inflow into unemployment fell back to its 
trend level. Excluding fostered workers, headcount in the 
public sector declined gradually in 2011, reflecting the 
government’s increasingly stringent wage bill management.
The number of employed also declined in the private sector 
in January, with some 30,000 persons dismissed. Neither 
LFS-data nor the data of the National Employment Service 
on the number of registered unemployed and lay-offs 
confirmed the extent of the decline. In the previous years, 
headcount in businesses with less than 50 employees moved 
in close conjunction with that in businesses with over 50 
employees. However, the decline in January only 
materialised in businesses with less than 50 employees 
(Chart 6-9).
Numerous analyses established a causal link between lay-
offs and the costs of the minimum wage increase. However, 
decline in employment materialised in both corporations 
with low wages that are more affected by the minimum 
wage increase and corporations paying higher than average 
wages. As no significant connection between the January 
change in wages and change in employment can be found, 
no conclusive inference can be drawn exclusively on the 
basis of January data as to whether or not lay-offs were 
triggered by the minimum wage increase (Chart 6-10). 
The regular yearly change in the Central Statistical Office’s 
sampling of corporations with 5 to 49 employees is a more 
likely explanation for the decline in headcount. In previous 
Chart 6-8
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Chart 6-9
number employed in the private sector, institutional 
statistics
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years, there were similar shifts in employment due to the 
change in sample, although they typically meant an increase 
in the number of employees. The current decline may also 
suggest that the employment situation of small enterprises 
in the private sector is likely to have been worse already in 
2011 than we had thought. 
Overall, we think that the number of employees in the 
private sector may have started to decline already at the 
end of 2011, concurrently with deterioration in outlook for 
economic recovery. Only increasingly strong labour supply is 
likely to have been able to trigger increase in the group of 
the self-employed and micro-enterprises. It is still early to 
draw conclusions about the impact of the minimum wage 
increase on staffing levels, at least the data on January do 
not support such a hypothesis. We anticipate lower 
employment levels in the private sector in response to an 
ailing economic environment in 2012. relative to 2011, this 
is unlikely to be cushioned by community work programmes. 
Although the number of fostered workers employed 
simultaneously will be increasing, the total number of 
fostered workers will drop to two-thirds of the 2011 figure 
during the year. Accordingly, the rate of unemployment 
may remain at a consistently high level.
Chart 6-10
number employed in the private sector, institutional 
statistics
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7  technical annex: Decomposition  
of the 2012 average inflation
table 7-1
Decomposition of the inflation to overlapping and incoming effect
effect on CpI in 2012
overlapping effect Incoming effect yearly index
Administered prices 0.1 0.4 0.5
Market prices 0.7 2.0 2.7
Indirect taxes and government measures 0.6 1.8 2.3
CPI 1.4 4.2 5.6
Note: The tables show the decomposition of the yearly average change of the consumer price index. The yearly change is the sum of the so called 
overlapping and incoming effects. The overlapping effect is the part of the yearly index, which can be explained by the preceding year's price changes, 
while the incoming effect reflects the changes in the recent year. We decomposed these indices to the sub-aggregates of the consumer price index; 
and we calculated inflationary effects of the changes in the indirect taxes, the administered prices, and market prices (not administered prices 
excluding indirect tax effects). The figures have been calculated using the technical effect of the VAT hike.
table 7-2
Detailed decomposition of our inflation forecast to overlapping and incoming effects*
2012
average 
overlapping effect
overlapping 
indirect tax effect
average incoming 
effect
Incoming indirect 
tax effect
yearly index
Food −0.4 0.1 4.8 1.2 5.8
   non-processed −3.3 0.0 5.8 1.6 4.0
   processed 1.2 0.2 4.3 1.0 6.9
Traded goods 0.9 0.2 0.8 1.3 3.2
   durables −0.3 0.0 −0.1 0.8 0.3
   non-durables 1.2 0.2 1.3 1.5 4.3
Market services 1.0 0.0 1.9 1.5 4.4
Market energy 3.0 0.0 3.4 1.6 8.2
Alcohol and tobacco 0.2 2.8 2.2 6.3 11.9
Fuel 5.2 1.2 3.8 1.6 12.4
Administered prices 0.6 0.7 2.0 1.2 4.6
Consumer Price Index 0.8 0.6 2.5 1.8 5.6
Core inflation 0.9 0.5 1.7 2.2 5.3
Note: The tables show the decomposition of the yearly average change of the consumer price index. The yearly change is the sum of the so called 
overlapping and incoming effects. The overlapping effect is the part of the yearly index, which can be explained by the preceding year's price changes, 
while the incoming effect reflects the changes in the recent year. We decomposed these indices to the sub-aggregates of the consumer price index; 
and we calculated inflationary effects of the changes in the indirect taxes, the administered prices, and market prices (not administered prices 
excluding indirect tax effects). The figures have been calculated using the technical effect of the VAT hike.
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